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 i 
ABSTRACT 
 
This study systematically reviews the literature that can constitute the foundations for the 
connection of two areas that have hitherto been developed separately: analyst behaviour 
and going-concern opinions. Financial lit erature claims that analyst judgement is biased 
given their tendency to systematically underreact in the presence of bad news and their 
tendency to systematically overreact in the presence of good news. Considering that going-
concern modifications constitute an unambiguous and acute case of bad news, this event 
presents a unique opportunity to explore analysts’ anticipation of and reaction to the 
presence of bad news. This analysis can provide further evidence on analysts’ optimism 
and their role in the apparent delayed impact of bad news to investors. A systematic review 
of the literature is developed in order to guarantee methodological rigour in the review 
process. The systematic search for studies in the refined scope finds 40 papers that are 
analysed and synthesised. These papers are discussed in order to justify the potential gap 
in the literature and the research opportunities available for a doctoral study. The results 
suggest that the connection between these areas can sustain a doctoral study and 
contribute for the development of the accounting and finance framework. 
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CHAPTER 1 - INTRODUCTION 
 
The issue of rationality has been discussed in several areas of knowledge without 
consensus. In the course of this discussion, the different perspectives about the degree of 
human rationality are drawn from two different views about human behaviour. Rational 
choice theory proponents argue that human judgment can be modelled mathematically, 
suggesting that people optimize their decision processes in order to find the “one best 
solution”. The alternative perspective, bounded rationality, states that the previous theory 
is not realistic since people’s limited analytical capacities prevent anything near complete 
rationality. 
In finance, there are two competing approaches to understanding financial markets. The 
traditional finance framework posits that agents satisfy the conditions of completeness and 
transitivity, and therefore, behave as fully rational Bayesians maximizers of their subjective 
utility functions. Behavioural finance constitutes the alternative approach, which is 
consistent with the arguments of the bounded rationality perspective. Behavioural finance 
states that some financial phenomena can be better understood using models that consider 
some agents as not being fully rational. Under this framework, agents use heuristics and 
rules of thumb when forming their beliefs, rather than the laws of probability (Sandroni, 
2005). 
Considering the nature of their work, security analysts are viewed as a sophisticated group 
of decision-makers acting in financial markets. Consequently, these market agents present 
a unique opportunity to analyse and test the two competing theories in finance and to 
provide further evidence in the debate between full and bounded rationality. Easterwood 
and Nutt (1999) present one of the clearest definitions of rationality in the security analyst 
context. They state that “a rational analysis of analyst behavior predicts that analysts 
immediately and without bias incorporate information into their forecasts”. Under this 
definition, evidence collected through empirical research suggests that analysts are, in fact, 
not rational in the sense that their forecasts are biased (e.g., de Bondt and Thaler, 1990; 
Trueman, 1994; Easterwood and Nutt, 1999; Ahmed et al., 2000; Beckers et al., 2004). 
One of the most important ideas extracted from this body of literature is that analyst 
forecasts are optimistic. This optimism is derived from the systematic positive difference 
between forecast and actual earnings per share (EPS) (e.g., Stickel, 1990; Abarbanell, 
1991; Brown, 1997; Easterwood and Nutt, 1999) and the permanent higher number of buy 
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recommendations compared with the number of sell recommendations (e.g., Womack, 
1996; Ho and Harris, 1998; Ryan and Taffler, 2004). 
Two principal explanations for this non-rational behaviour are cognitive-bias explanations 
and economic incentives-based explanations (Kothari, 2001). Broadly speaking, cognitive-
bias explanations argue that financial agents use heuristics and rules of thumb when they 
process information. Under this assumption, analysts are subject to the same biases as 
subjects in laboratory experiments. In fact, evidence of analysts’ systematic asymmetric 
reaction conditional on the nature of information (Amir and Ganzach, 1998; Easterwood 
and Nutt, 1999) is better understood under the cognitive-bias approach. On the other 
hand, economic incentive-based explanations advocate that agency problems underlie 
analysts’ optimism. In fact, the literature suggests that analysts’ working environment and 
incentives can lead to several distortions in their analyses. Easterwood and Nutt (1999) 
suggest two factors which help us to understand their optimism in this context: the 
economic incentives that analysts have to promote the purchase of stocks, and their work 
dependency on the access to the top executives of the firms they follow. One of the most 
frequently  cited examples is the particular optimism regarding analysts who work for 
brokerage firms (Dugar and Nathan, 1995) or analysts working for brokerage houses with 
investment banking activities (Michael and Womack, 1999). 
The discussion behind rationality in market agents is crucial since this issue constitutes the 
basis of several debates in accounting and finance. Despite the strong theoretical 
background underpinning the traditional finance framework, should we ignore empirical 
evidence showing that, in general, agents present biased behaviour? This question raises a 
critical issue in the development of finance theory: should we continue to develop research 
based on the premise that agents are fully rational or should we relax this strong 
assumption? Analyst behaviour constitutes a unique opportunity to clarify these issues, 
since they act as sophisticated agents in the market, which recognizes the importance of 
their opinions given the impact of their recommendations and earnings forecasts (e.g., 
Stickel, 1991; Womack, 1996; Ho and Harris, 1998; Park and Stice, 2000; Barber et al., 
2001; Barber et al., 2003; Ryan and Taffler, 2004). 
Although analyst optimism has been documented in general, there is lack of evidence 
regarding their specific behaviour in extreme situations. As Schipper (1991) points out, it 
makes sense to investigate decision strategies in extreme cases, because research 
suggests that optimism seems to be most pronounced in forecasts preceded by share price 
declines or earnings declines. One of the events that produce substantial declines in share 
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prices is the going-concern modification (GCM) audit report. Several papers document that 
audit qualifications in general, and the GCM in particular, have a significant negative impact 
on the stock market (Firth, 1978; Chow and Rice, 1982; Banks and Kinney, 1982; Dopuch 
et al., 1986; Frost, 1991; Taffler et al., 2004; Kausar et al., 2004). Given the market 
reaction to going-concern opinions, it makes sense to investigate how analysts deal with 
this particular event, which is perceived as a clear case of bad news by markets. In fact, by 
linking these two areas of the literature, it is possible to give a new insight to analyst 
optimism and thus, to make a contribution to the development of the accounting and 
finance disciplines. 
The literature review undertaken in this dissertation regarding these two areas is based on 
the systematic review of the literature suggested by Tranfield et al. (2003). This process 
allows the definition of a transparent process in order to avoid the weaknesses of the 
traditional narrative review. Therefore, the connection between analyst behaviour and 
going-concern opinions is made with an explicit method to identify, select and review the 
relevant studies. The systematic review of the literature demonstrates that there is a 
sufficient gap in the literature and unclear issues that justify further research to be 
developed into a PhD. In fact, the review process shows that going-concern opinions and 
analysts’ behaviour represent two different topics that have been considered  separately in  
the literature. No study has looked at these two domains together and explored their 
possible relation. 
Although there is evidence that analysts underreact to negative information (e.g., Amir and 
Ganzach, 1998; Easterwood and Nutt, 1999), their reaction to a going-concern opinion has 
not been explored in the literature to date. Additionally, the fact that markets react 
asymmetrically to good and bad news in the going-concern context (Kausar et al., 2004), 
highlights the importance of the research regarding security analysts’ role in the whole  
process. This dissertation discusses several research opportunities extracted from the 
critical analysis of the papers selected using the systematic review approach. Therefore, 
the challenge of my doctoral project is to link together these two different areas of the 
literature that have been developed separately until now. 
The dissertation is structured as follows: 
Chapter two reviews the major literature relating to this study. Section one discusses the 
concept of rationality, describes two different approaches to human behaviour drawn from 
this concept and analyses their implications in two competing theories in finance: 
traditional finance and behavioural finance. Section two reviews the role of analysts in the 
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market and explores the nature of their rational (or non-rational) behaviour. Particular 
emphasis is given to analysts’ explanations of forecast bias. Section three explores the 
issues behind the going-concern assumption and their relevance to markets. Section four 
discusses the problem and delimits the boundaries of the study. 
Chapter three describes the methodology approach based on the systematic review of the 
literature. Section one analyses the rationale behind this process, section two describes the 
review aims, and section three defines the systematic review process. This section contains 
the definition of the process that allows the selection of the papers that constitute the 
sample for my findings and final discussion. 
Chapter four presents the findings of the systematic review process. Section one makes a 
descriptive analysis of the selected papers. Section two reports the findings with the form 
of a thematic analysis. Section three presents the discussion of the findings. 
Chapter five concludes the dissertation. Section one discusses the implications for further 
research. Section two presents the methodology appraisal. Section three presents the 
author’s reflections on the learning experience and section four concludes the dissertation. 
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CHAPTER 2 – KEY LITERATURE 
 
This chapter reviews the major literature of the two areas that I want to connect: analyst 
behaviour and going-concern opinions. The chapter begins with a discussion of rationality 
and the different views regarding human behaviour, considering their implications in the 
finance domain. In addition, it evaluates analyst behaviour highlighting the behavioural 
explanations justifying this phenomenon, although reviewing the economic -based 
explanations. The going-concern assumption is introduced with the objective of analysing 
the importance of this event for the understanding of analyst behaviour in extreme 
situations. A common issue in the two areas reviewed is the market impact of each output: 
analysts’ recommendations, earnings forecasts, and accompanying reports and going-
concern reports. The delimitation of the systematic review boundaries is presented at the 
end of the chapter. 
2.1. The concept of rationality 
Classical economic theory is based on the concept of rationality (Arrow, 1986). Classical 
economists, like Smith and Ricardo, sustained the development of this discipline in notions 
that are closely related to this concept. Several examples of rational behaviour are present 
in the discourse of these classical economists: the preference for more rather than less, the 
investment in industries yielding the highest rate of return, the minimization of costs or 
profit maxim ization, among others (Arrow, 1986). Nowadays, economists’ definition of 
rationality is based on the concepts of completeness (choices can be ranked) and 
transitivity (if x>y and y>z, then x>z), which together represent the maximization of a 
function.1 This approach emerged only in the 1950s since before that time, economists 
assumed that people were motivated by “self-interest” (Arrow, 1986). 
Traditional finance draws on classical economics to develop models that explain financial 
markets based on the assumption that market participants are rational (Barberis and 
Thaler, 2003). According to Barberis and Thaler (2003), rationality has two meanings: 1) 
when agents receive new information they update their beliefs correctly , particularly in the 
manner described by Bayes’ law and 2) given their beliefs, agents make choices that are 
normatively acceptable, in the sense that they are consistent with Savage’s (1972) notion 
of Subjective Expected Utility (SEU). 
                                                 
1 The function may be related to utility, costs, profits, among other variables.  
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The next two sections briefly illustrate the foundations of rational behaviour, namely the 
two main theories behind this issue: rational choice theory and bounded rationality. 
2.1.1. Rational choice theory 
Rational choice theory differs from other perspectives that see human action as involving 
both rational and non-rational elements. This perspective denies the existence of any other 
type of action than the purely rational and calculative one (Scott, 2000), suggesting full 
rationality in decision-makers.2 Turner (2002) presents five assumptions of rational choice 
theory: 
1. Humans are purposive and goal oriented; 
2. Humans have sets of hierarchically ordered preferences, or utilities; 
3. In choosing lines of behaviour, humans make rational calculations; 
4. Emergent social phenomena - social structures, collective decisions, and collective 
behaviour - are ultimately the result of rational choices made by utility-maximizing 
individuals; 
5. Emergent social phenomena that arise from rational choices constitute a set of 
parameters for subsequent rational choices of individuals. 
These five points reveal that the rational process is very demanding, assuming that people 
are goal oriented and, conditional on their preferences, they can find the “one best 
solution”. It is particularly noteworthy that rational choice theory suggests that individuals 
are able to state their preferences by their wants or goals, and that these preferences 
motivate the actions taken by individuals. This framework also posits that individuals must 
anticipate the outcome of every alternative course of action, calculate which will be the 
best for them and choose the alternative that is likely to give them the greatest satisfaction 
(Coleman, 1973; Heath, 1976). This means that fully rational man knows the solution of all 
complex mathematical problems, regardless of their level of difficulty (Selten, 2001). For 
the defenders of this framework, the available mathematical tools, in particular the rules of 
Bayes and Bernoulli, are seen as descriptions of actual human judgement (Datson, 1981). 
The decision process is always associated with information, efficiency, optimization, 
                                                 
2 The apparent success of economics in explaining human behaviour as a function of money and by the possibility of 
making a profit, leads other social sciences in this direction (Scott, 2000). According to Scott (2000), these social 
scientists have tried to build theories around the idea that all action is fundamentally rational in nature and that people 
do the cost / benefit analysis before making a decision. 
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implementation and design (Scott, 2003). The understanding of these complex 
assumptions leads us to conclude that people are required to have unlimited cognitive 
capabilities whenever taking fully rational decisions. 
Hatch (1997) presents a model with five steps that defines a typical rational decision-
making process in organizations, which can be generalized to decision-makers. The first 
step of the model is to define the problem and the collection of relevant information. The 
following step is the generation and evaluation of all the possible alternatives available, 
considering the likelihood of the positive and negative consequences of each one. After 
that, decision-makers should choose the best possible alternative, given their set of 
objectives. The last steps consist of the implementation of the selected alternative and 
monitoring the results. In a dynamic perspective, this last action will lead to the first step 
of the model and to another optimized decision. 
The specific limitations of organizations and human capacities provide the arguments that 
some scholars have used to criticize the assumptions of rational models. Simon presents 
some limitations of rational decision-making models, which are inconsistent with full 
rationality (Hatch, 1997): 
1. Imperfect and incomplete information; 
2. The complexity of problems; 
3. Human information-processing capacity; 
4. The time available for decision-making processes; 
5. The conflicting preferences decision-makers have for organizational goals. 
These limitations represent the starting point for the development of an alternative to 
rational choice models: bounded rationality. 
2.1.2. Bounded rationality 
Bounded rationality theory emerged as a critique to rational choice theory. The empirical 
evidence and the observation of human behaviour suggest a fundamental role for limited 
cognition as an aspect of decision-making, something that is not captured by the neo-
classical framework. Under this alternative, humans attempt to be rational but their limited 
capacities prevent anything near complete rationality (Perrow, 1993). The existence of 
such limitations restricts the usefulness of rational choice assumptions in understanding the 
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actual behaviour of decision-makers; people are simply unable to follow such demanding 
processes. 
One of the main critiques to rational choice is that people cannot consider all their options 
in choosing their solutions to given problems. Put simply, decision-makers do not have 
complete knowledge of the alternative courses of action available to them or they cannot 
afford to attain that knowledge. Moreover, even if people knew all their alternatives, it 
would be almost impossible to rank them according with their preferences (Simon, 1997). 
As a result, people tend to simplify available alternatives and select the first acceptable 
one.  
Several studies document many other restrictions to the optimal choice. Klein (2001) 
presents eleven boundary conditions for optimizing decisions that review the main 
assumptions presented in the literature: 
1. The goals must be well defined, in quantitative terms (Koopman and Pool, 1991); 
2. The decision-maker’s values must be stable (Fischhoff, 1991; Slovic, 1995; March, 
1978); 
3. The situation must be stable (Pitz, 1992); 
4. The task is restricted to a selection between options (Berkeley and Humphreys, 
1982); 
5. The number of alternatives generated must be exhaustive (Janis and Mann, 1977; 
Koopman and Pool, 1991); 
6. The optimal choice can be selected without disproportional time and effort 
(Gigerenzer and Todd, 1999; Minsky, 1986; von Winterfeldt and Edwards, 1986); 
7. The options must be thoroughly compared to each other (Janis and Mann, 1977); 
8. The decision-maker must use a compensatory strategy (Janis and Mann, 1977); 
9. The probability estimates must be coherent and accurate (Beyth-Marom et al., 
1991); 
10. The scenarios used to predict failures must be exhaustive and realistic (Pitz, 1992); 
11. The evaluation of each scenario must be exhaustive (Pitz, 1992). 
It is noteworthy that the existence of these restrictions to optimal choice does not mean 
that bounded rationality is the same as irrationality. Indeed, we cannot substitute 
rationality by irrationality just because people’s behaviour fails to conform the norms of full 
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rationality. A decision maker who is guided by aspiration adaptation mechanism rather than 
utility maximization may be perfectly rational (Selten, 2001), even if he or she does not 
choose the “one best decision”.3 
Herbert Simon introduced the idea of bounded rationality, originally a psychological 
concept, into economics.4 Since then, bounded rationality has started to be viewed as the 
main alternative to neo-classic rationality. Optimization plays a central role in rational 
choice theory , and consequently , in the traditional finance approach. Simon (1956) defines 
optimization as the selection of the best choice, the one with the highest expected utility. 
However, considering that decision-makers do not have the unlimited cognitive capacities 
that are required to achieve optimal solutions, Simon developed an alternative theoretical 
framework. Under this alternative perspective, the satisfying agent takes the place of the 
rational agent and satisficing behaviour substitutes the model of global rationality. This 
satisficing agent is not making a mistake when he chooses his non-optimal payoff, because 
satisficing involves choosing an alternative that exceeds some criterion or target (Simon, 
1997). In fact, satisfice means selecting the first course of an action that appears to be 
successful, even if it is not the best (Klein, 2001). 
2.1.3. Rationality implications in finance 
Considering that rationality is a central issue in the development of finance, these two 
different views about rationality have implications in the finance domain. The next two 
sections describe the two alternative approaches in the finance world that are based on the 
previous discussion. 
 
 
                                                 
3 Simon (1956) develops two alternatives to utility maximization in order to explain decision-making processes: 
adjusting the aspiration level and adjusting the set of behavioural alternatives. He described decision-making as a 
search process guided by aspiration levels. An aspiration level is a value of a goal variable that must be reached or 
surpassed by a satisfactory decision alternative. However, aspiration levels are not permanently fixed but are rather 
dynamically adjusted to the situation. Aspiration levels are raised if it is easy to find satisfactory alternatives and 
lowered if satisfactory alternatives are hard to obtain (Selten, 2001). Search for alternatives, satisficing and aspiration 
adaptation constitute three main concepts in Simon’s view of bounded rationality. 
4 Conlisk (1996) presents in his survey four reasons that justify the incorporation of bounded rationality in economic 
models: 1. There is abundant empirical evidence showing the importance of bounded rationality; 2. Models of bounded 
rationality have proved themselves in a wide range of impressive work; 3. The standard justifications for assuming 
unbounded rationality are unconvincing and 4. Deliberation about an economic decision is a costly activity, and good 
economics requires that we entertain all costs. 
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2.3.1.1. Traditional finance 
Rational optimization of agents and equilibrium constitute the two pillars of traditional 
finance literature. The rational choice perspective supports the economic definition of 
rationality, which is embedded in two important concepts: completeness and transitivity.  
This approach is largely based on an unrealistic picture of human decision-making, which 
assumes that economic agents are fully rational Bayesian maximizers of subjective utility.5 
One of the reasons that explains why Bayes’ theorem was used to build economic theory 
and financial modelling is their nonarbitrary characteristic, which is a useful discipline to 
modelling, although the evidence on heuristics and biases suggests that Bayesian updating 
is not fully descriptive of human behaviour (Hirshleifer, 2001).6 Bayesians assume that 
agents have a coherent preference structure that is characterized axiomatically and defines 
a notion of a probabilistic mixture of outcomes. These rational agents care about utilitarian 
characteristics, do not commit cognitive errors, have perfect self-control, are always risk 
averse and are never averse to regret (Statman, 1999). The traditional finance framework 
is highly analytical and normative, assuming a world dominated by homo economicus, who 
is fully  rational and focused on utility maximization. 
Despite the strong theoretical background behind traditional finance perspective, several 
studies document price behaviour and decision-making processes inconsistent with rational 
expectations models.7 According to Sandroni (2005), there are two causes for the 
documented anomalies: agents suffer from cognitive biases when forming beliefs (do not 
process information according to Bayes’ rule) or do not have sufficient information to hold 
correct beliefs. 
Although finance is considered to be a social science that acknowledges the existence of 
mental models of choice, the academic study of finance involves little or no examination of 
individual decision-making (Olsen, 1998). One of the reasons is that finance and economics 
are primarily concerned with prediction rather than description or explanation (Olsen, 
1998). In response to the difficulties faced by the traditional paradigm, behavioural finance 
                                                 
5 Bayes's theorem is a simple mathematical formula used for calculating conditional probabilities that figures 
prominently in subjectivist or Bayesian approaches. Subjectivists, who maintain that rational belief is governed by the 
laws of probability, lean heavily on conditional probabilities in their theories of evidence and their models of empirical 
learning. Bayes’s theorem is used to calculate the formally optimal rule about how opinions, meaning probabilities, 
should be revised based on new information (Edwards, 1982). According to this approach, these probabilities are just 
numbers between zero and one that represent the extent to which a somewhat idealized person believes a statement to 
be true. 
6 Several studies suggest that agents do not update their beliefs correctly since people seem to be influenced by 
“irrelevant alternatives”. For more details, see Hirshleifer (2001).  
7 See Daniel et al. (1998), Shleifer (2000) and Barberis and Thaler (2003) for a literature review of financial anomalies. 
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has recently emerged in an attempt to understand financial markets. In contrast to 
traditional finance, behavioural finance states that some financial phenomena can be better 
understood using models that consider some agents as not being fully rational. 
2.3.1.2. Behavioural finance 
Behavioural finance relaxes the assumption that agents form beliefs according to the laws 
of probability and assumes that simpler heuristic  rules are used (Sandroni, 2005). This new 
approach seeks to incorporate the implications of psychological decision processes in the 
decision-making process (Olsen, 1998). Behavioural finance draws on an extensive 
experimental literature on judgment under uncertainty that suggests that people do not 
behave consistently with the rules of probability and statistics (Griffin and Tversky, 2002). 
Given that time and cognitive resources are limited, natural selection has designed minds 
that implement rules-of-thumb8 selectively to a subset of cues (Hirshleifer, 2001). Olsen 
(1998) presents two reasons for the current interest in behavioural finance: the empirical 
evidence that alternative financial theories seem to be deficient in fundamental ways, and 
the development of prospect theory . 
There are several papers documenting empirical inconsistencies with the traditional finance 
paradigm.9 These inconsistencies constituted the starting point for the development of the 
behavioural finance theory, which is seen as an emerging alternat ive to traditional finance. 
Behavioural finance is constituted by two building blocks: psychology and the limits to 
arbitrage (Barberis and Thaler, 2003).10 
Given the experimental work showing that people systematically violate SEU theory when 
choosing among risky gambles (Barberis and Thaler, 2003), several non-SEU theories have 
been developed in the last few decades.11 One of the best-known non-SEU theories is  
prospect theory. Kahneman and Tversky (1979) introduced prospect theory as a critique of 
expected utility theory . According to SEU theory, utility derives solely from the probability 
distribution of payoffs resulting from a choice, ignoring people’s regret aversion 
(Hirshleifer, 2001). Kahneman and Tversky (1979) contend that choices made among risky 
prospects are inconsistent with the basic tenets of the SEU theory. This alternative 
approach is based on more realistic behavioural assumptions to explain how people deal 
                                                 
8 The literature defines rules-of-thumb as “algorithms”, “heuristics”, or “mental models”. 
9 For a first approach see the article compilations in Thaler (1993) and Thaler (2005). 
10 For an introduction, see Barberis and Thaler (2003).  
11 Barberis and Thaler (2003) present a list of the better known models based on non-SEU theories.  
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with loss in making choices in the face of risk and uncertainty, namely capturing the 
documented risk aversion.12  
2.2. Analyst behaviour 
Security analysts play a central role in financial markets. There are several reasons 
justifying academic research related to analysts’13 work and their behaviour in financial 
markets. Additionally, there is empirical evidence showing that market prices move in the 
direction of analysts’ recommendations and earnings estimates (e.g., Stickel, 1991; 
Womack, 1996; Ho and Harris, 1998; Park and Stice, 2000; Barber et al., 2001; Barber et 
al., 2003; Ryan and Taffler, 2004). Considering that security analysts are sophisticated 
agents, can we expect rationality in analysts’ behaviour? This section discusses several 
biases that are inconsistent with rational behaviour and concludes with an overview of 
several empirical papers that document the biased behaviour of security analysts. 
2.2.1. Analysts’ role in the market 
Thousands of analysts follow a large population of companies and produce regular reports 
evaluating firms’ securities. Usually, each analyst follows ten to twenty stocks in a given 
industry or economic sector, which makes them industry specialists (Schipper, 1991). 
Analysts are considered sophisticated agents given their importance as intermediaries 
between firms and investors. These sophisticated agents collect, process and disseminate 
information to current and prospective investors. Their  privileged access to information 
may lead us to believe that the stocks they recommend will experience superior 
performance.14 
One important responsibility of analysts identified in the literature relates to their role in 
improving market efficiency by providing investors with the information necessary to make 
informed decisions (Moyer at al., 1989). Market prices do move in the direction of analysts’ 
                                                 
12 According to the proponents of prospect theory, individuals maximize a weighted sum of “values” (analogous to 
utilities) where the weights are not based on true probabilities, but in functions of probabilities (Hirshleifer, 2001). 
Another difference is that extremely low probabilities are treated as impossibilities, and extremely high probabilities as 
certainties. However, very (but not extremely) low probabilities are overestimated, and very (but not extremely) high 
probabilities are overestimated. For the intermediate probabilities, the weighting function increases with a slope less 
than one. 
13 There are two different categories of analysts: “sell-side analysts” and “buy-side analysts”. Sell-side analysts are 
security analysts employed by banks and brokerage firms, who release information to markets. “Buy-side analysts” are 
employed by institutional investment firms. Although both analyst categories make recommendations, sell-side analysts 
are the primary producers of earnings forecasts (Schipper, 1999).  
14 Beckers et al. (2004) mention that individual and institutional investors use analysts’ reports when they make 
portfolio selections or revision decisions. Additionally, they also state that analysts’ earnings forecasts are used in equity 
valuation models. 
CRANFIELD SCHOOL OF MANAGEMENT  13 
recommendations, but prices do not always adjust immediately. In certain cases, there is a 
drift that persists for several weeks or months (e.g., Womack, 1996) raising doubts about 
how efficient the market is at incorporating the value of changed stock recommendations. 
Security analyst power in influencing investors’ decisions and stock prices raise one of the 
most fundamental questions in finance: can analysts intentionally manipulate stock prices, 
even temporarily , from their equilibrium values? (Michaely and Womack, 2005). 
The finance literature also suggests that analyst-monitoring activity is an important control 
element that helps to reduce agency costs associated with the separation of ownership and 
management (e.g., Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Doukas et al., 2000). By following firms, 
analysts contribute to the disciplining of corporate managers (Chung and Jo, 1996) since 
managers’ decisions will be closely monitored and publicized. Consequently, they are less 
likely to pursue activities that benefit themselves at the expense of shareholders. This 
situation gives an important social purpose to analysts’ work, which highlights the 
importance of analysts’ provision of objective and accurate information to the market and 
shareholders (Cote and Goodstein, 1999).  
Analysts’ earnings forecasts are also used as a proxy for market earnings expectations. 
This method is used as an alternative to statistical models based on previous realizations of 
earnings since it is more accurate than mechanical models (Schipper, 1991). The literature, 
in fact, advocates a stronger association between market response to earnings and 
forecast errors based on analysts’ forecasts than those generated by mechanical models. 
This is not surprising since analysts have direct access to such statistical models and they 
are able to use more information to project future earnings. 15 
De Bondt and Thaler (1990) set out three reasons justifying the interest in this particular 
group of market agents. Firstly, research suggests that earnings forecasts and forecasts 
revisions influence stock prices. Secondly, research advocates that analysts are rather good 
at what they do since their forecasts often outperform time-series models (e.g., Conroy 
and Harris, 1987). Thirdly, the precision of analyst expectations represents a natural upper 
boundary to the quality of the earnings forecasts of less sophisticated agents, since most 
investors cannot produce their own predictions. 
 
 
                                                 
15 Hirshleifer (2001) argues that it is expected that rational agents provide at least positive incremental value in their 
forecasting activity. 
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2.2.2. Importance of analysts’ opinions to the market 
A vast amount of literature suggests that analysts’ information releases influence stock 
prices. In fact, analysts’ outputs, such as earnings estimates and changes in 
recommendations, influence the evaluation of security prices (e.g., Stickel, 1991; Womack, 
1996; Ho and Harris, 1998; Park and Stice, 2000; Barber et al., 2001; Barber et al. , 2003; 
Ryan and Taffler, 2004). Empirical research finds that, on average, the markets react 
favourably to positive changes in recommendations and have a negative reaction to a drop 
in recommendations. 
For instance, Stickel (1991) finds that earnings revisions affect prices, and that their impact 
is greater when the percentage forecast change is in the top or bottom five percent of the 
distribution of all forecast revisions. Using a large database of individual analyst forecasts, 
he also notices that prices do not immediately assimilate such information since they 
continue to drift in the direction of the revision for about six months. In fact, when Stickel 
(1991) developed a trading strategy that predicted price reactions based on incomplete 
incorporation of such public ly available information, he found 6-month average abnormal 
returns of 8.22 percent and -5.44 percent respectively for his predicted best and worst 
performance portfolios. 
In a subsequent paper, Stic kel (1992) claims a positive relation between analysts’ 
reputations and price impact of an earnings forecast revision announcement. Using a 
different measure of analysts’ reputations based on analysts’ forecast accuracy compared 
to a consensus forecast, Park and Stice (2000) conclude that market participants recognize 
differential analysts’ forecast ability. Forecast revisions by superior analysts have a greater 
impact on security prices than revisions by inferior analysts. 
In one of the most frequently  cited papers in this area, Womack (1996) finds strong 
evidence that stock prices are significantly influenced by analysts’ recommendation 
changes. Using US data, he finds significant initial price and volume reaction in the three-
day event period around the recommendation change. However, in the case of new buy 
recommendations, most price impact occurs around the announcement date, while the new 
sell recommendations have a longer impact.16 In a parallel UK-based study, Ryan and 
Taffler (2004) also find that the impact of new sell recommendations is greater than that of 
new buy recommendations, particularly  in the case of small firms. The authors argue that 
                                                 
16 The post-recommendation drift associated with buy recommendations is significant and short lived (+2.4 percent for 
the first post-event month), but the post-recommendation drift associated with sell recommendations is larger and 
longer (-9.1 percent for the first six -month post-event period).  
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this situation can be explained by the potential cost of disseminating new sell 
recommendations since such changes are less frequent, and consequently  are more costly 
to analysts’ reputations. 
2.2.3. Analysts’ forecasts bias explanations 
Despite the studies included in the above section clearly pointing to the relevance of 
analysts’ opinions to the market, several papers present evidence of analysts’ biased 
behaviour. The presence of these biases is consistent with analysts’ non-rational behaviour 
according to Easterwood and Nutt’s (1999) definition of analyst rational behaviour. One of 
the strongest common denominators in these studies is the analysts’ optimism. However, 
Kothari (2001) states that estimates of analysts’ optimism vary across studies, in part 
because of the differences in research design, variable definitions, and periods examined. 
Additionally, Kothari (2001) presents three hypotheses for such decline in analyst 
optimism: 1) analysts are learning from the evidence of past bias; 2) analysts’ incentives 
have changed, and 3) the quality of data used in the research examining analysts’ forecast 
properties has improved. There are several reasons for analysts’ non-rational behaviour. 
Kothari (2001) identifies two main explanations for this non-rational behaviour: behavioural 
cognitive-bias explanations and economic incentives-based explanations. The next sections 
reflect this distinction, analysing the major papers regarding these two explanations. 
2.2.3.1. Analyst cognitive-bias explanation 
Cognitive biases that describe analysts’ judgement are drawn from the psychological 
literature that presents evidence of non-rational behaviour in several circumstances. 
Although some of these psychological effects have potential relevance to security markets, 
economists have traditionally been sceptical in accepting the relation between 
psychological effects and markets. The main argument to criticise this approach is that 
errors are independent across individuals and that they cancel out in equilibrium 
(Hirshleifer, 2001). However, the experimental psychology literature presents a vast 
number of studies documenting systematic biases in human behaviour.17 In a 
comprehensive survey about investor psychology and asset pricing, Hirshleifer (2001) 
argues that heuristic simplification, self-deception, and emotional loss of control provide a 
unified explanation for most known judgment and decision biases. In finance, these 
                                                 
17 See Gilovich et al. (2002) for a comprehensive review.  
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cognitive biases are used to explore how people form beliefs and preferences, and how 
they make decisions (Barberis and Thaler, 2003). 
One interesting question that can be extracted from the first hypothesis defined by Kothari 
(2001) for the decline in analyst optimism is the reason why security analysts in particular, 
and people in general, do not learn their way out of biased judgment. According to 
Hirshleifer (2001), they do it to a certain extent, which is consistent with Kothari’s first 
hypotheses above. However, Hirshleifer (2001) presents two barriers that make 
impracticable the extinction of such biases: the hardness of the learning process and the 
self-deception bias. This last barrier, which is a tendency to adjust attitudes to match past 
actions, is a mechanism designed to persuade the individual that he or she is a skilful 
decision maker. The next three sections discuss some of the main heuristics presented in 
finance that are able to influence analy sts’ behaviour. 
2.2.3.1.1. Overoptimism and overconfidence 
The tendency to be overoptimistic  is one of the best documented psychological errors. 
Montier (2002) states that such overoptimism results from a number of psychological 
biases, such as illusion of control and self-attribution. The first bias means that people feel 
themselves to be far more in control of a situation than they often actually are. The illusion 
of control, which has a positive correlation with the increase of information, manifests itself 
when people believe that they have influence over the outcome of uncontrollable events. 
This illusion of control, which influences the belief that a person can favourably influence 
unrelated chance events, is defined by Hirshleifer (2001) as a type of “magical thinking” 
given the belief in relations between causally unrelated actions or events. 
The self-attribution bias means that people attribute favourable outcomes to skill while bad 
outcomes are attributed to bad luck, or else they blame external factors for failure (e.g., 
Fischhoff, 1982; Langer and Roth, 1975; Miller and Ross, 1975 or Taylor and Brown, 1988). 
The empirical psychology literature reports that as individuals observe the outcomes of 
their actions, they update their confidence in their own ability in a biased manner, leading 
to overconfidence (Daniel et al., 1998). This bias contrasts with the economists’ view that 
people learn from past mistakes. 
Overconfidence has been documented in several contexts, including those of psychologists, 
engineers, entrepreneurs, managers, investment bankers, security analysts and others 
(Daniel et al., 1998). Daniel et al., (1998) and Odean (1998) mention several studies that 
model overconfidence in these heterogeneous contexts. A particularly interesting 
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contribution in this domain is that of Odean (1998). In this paper, the author summarizes 
previous research on overconfidence. Odean (1998) identifies some papers that present 
evidence consistent with overreaction: people tend to be overconfident in answering 
questions of moderate to extreme difficulty; people overestimate their ability to do well on 
tasks; people are unrealistically optimistic about future events; people expect good things 
to happen to them more often than to their peers; individuals see themselves as being 
better than the average person, and most individuals see themselves as being better than 
others see them, and people overestimate their own contributions to past positive 
outcomes. On the other hand, Griffin and Tversky (1992) suggest that experts tend to be 
more confident than relatively inexperienced individuals; something that applies to security 
analysts since they are seen as sophisticated agents in the market (Schipper, 1991). 
2.2.3.1.2. Overreaction and underreaction 
In a book of reference, Shleifer (2000) clarifies what under and overreaction means. 
According to his definition, underreaction to news announcements “occurs when the 
average return of the company’s stock in the period following an announcement of good 
news is higher than the average return in the period following bad news”. Analogous to 
this, he defines overreaction as occurring when “the average return following not one but a 
series of announcements of good news is lower than the average return following a series 
of bad news announcements”. This means that after a series of announcements of good 
news, the agent becomes overly optimistic that future news announcements will also be 
good and hence overreacts. 
Behavioural finance relies on a vast body of literature documenting patterns of returns that 
cannot be understood in the context of classical pricing theory to criticize the efficient 
market hypothesis. One of the main critiques to this alternative framework is that some 
aspects of the anomalous returns patterns documented in the behavioural literature seem 
contradictory. A clear example of this situation is the apparent market underreaction and 
overreaction in different contexts (Daniel et al., 1998). In fact, behavioural opponents ask 
for an integrated theory to explain these phenomena in addition to explanations offered for 
particular anomalies.18 
                                                 
18 Fama (1998) criticizes this result from the behavioural finance approach. In his view, the overreaction and 
underreaction phenomena cancel each other out and thus the market should, on average, converge to its fundamental 
value. He also argues that behavioural finance is unable to provide a proper framework to explain when over and 
underreaction should be expected.  
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Daniel et al. (1998) present one of the theories developed to fill this gap based on investor 
overconfidence about the precision of private information and variations in confidence 
arising from biased self-attribution. According to their theory, the difference between stock 
price overreaction and underreaction is the type of the information: stock prices overreact 
to private information and underreact to public signals. Their theory is based on 
experimental studies which find that individuals underestimate their error variance in 
making predictions, and overweight their own forecasts relative to those of others. This 
differentiation between over and underreaction has implications not only for investors, but 
also for security analysts since both generate information for trading such as interviewing 
management, verifying rumors, and analysing financial statements. In overestimating his 
ability to generate information, an  investor or analyst will underestimate his forecast errors 
leading to overconfidence about his private information, but not to public signals  received 
by all (Daniel et al., 1998). The theory presented by Daniel et al. (1998) to explain the over 
or underreaction assumes that, when the investor receives confirming public information, 
his confidence rises, but disconfirming information causes confidence to fall only 
moderately. 
Another important theory explaining the over and underreaction phenomenon states that 
overreaction is related to good news and underreaction is related to bad news. These two 
connections are consistent with systematic optimism in response to information. Amir and 
Ganzach (1998), Easterwood and Nutt (1999) and Nutt et al. (1999) explore this 
phenomenon in an analyst context and find an explanation for the disparate conclusions 
presented by de Bondt and Thaler (1990) and Abarbanel and Bernard (1992)19. These 
three papers contend that security analysts tend to overreact when they are disseminating 
good news, but they tend to underreact in the presence of bad news. 
2.2.3.1.3. Representativeness 
Psychologists Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky introduced the representativeness 
heuristic in the literature.20 They state that intuitive judgment is often the only practical 
method for assessing uncertainty, because people do not normally  have formal models for 
computing the probabilities of events. More specifically , their research finds that peoples’ 
                                                 
19 By analysing the relation between actual and predicted changes in earnings, de Bondt and Thaler (1990) and 
Abarbanell and Bernard (1992) find contrasting conclusions. De Bondt and Thaler (1990) argue that analysts 
systematically overreact to the release of information, but Abarbanell and Bernard (1992) conclude that overreaction to 
earnings cannot be found among analysts.  
20 Gilovich and Kahneman (2002) have compiled several papers about this heuristic.  
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intuitive forecasts have a tendency to overweigh salient information in recent news, and 
underweigh less salient data such as long-term averages. 
Tversky and Kahneman (1982) suggest that representativeness leads to the judgement of 
the probability of an event estimating probabilities by assessing similarity or cognitive 
distance. Other possible outcomes of representativeness presented by these authors is the 
estimation of probabilities by assessing availability, or associative distance. This means that 
items that are easier to recall are judged to be more common, which makes sense if we 
think that things that are more common are noticed or reported more often, making them 
easier to remember (Hirschleifer, 2001). In a recent work, Hirschleifer (2001) states that 
this heuristic “involves assessing the probability of a state of the world based on the 
degree to which the evidence is perceived as similar to or typical of the state of the world”. 
The perception of how representative a piece of evidence is of a state of the world may 
match its conditional probability poorly, and thus, lead to suboptimal decisions. 
Representativeness is one of the most important principles affecting financial decisions. It 
is defined as the tendency to judge the probability of an event by finding a comparable 
known event and assuming that the probabilities will be similar.21 De Bondt (1992) also 
suggests that security analysts display representativeness behaviour. He finds that analysts 
tend to be biased in the direction of recent success when they release long-term earnings 
forecasts since they are much more optimistic about recent winners than recent losers. 
Amir and Ganzach (1998) argue that representativeness, as with optimism and anchoring, 
influences analysts’ forecasts and that this heuristic leads to extreme predictions or 
overreaction. 
2.2.3.2. Economic incentives-based explanations 
Economic incentives represent a major explanation for analysts’ optimism. According to 
Easterwood and Nutt (1999), the economic incentives can broadly be divided into two 
characteristics: the direct incentive to promote the purchase of stocks, and the indirect 
incentive of access to the top executives.  
Cote and Goodstein (1999) argue that observers of the securities industry writing in the 
popular press, practitioner journals and academic journals have raised concerns related to 
                                                 
21 De Bondt et al. (1985) and de Bondt and Thaler (1987) present evidence of representativeness in finance, namely the 
winner-loser effect. De Bondt et al. (1985) build a simple investment strategy based on cognitive psychology’s work on 
intuitive prediction. Even considering that their prior winner stocks portfolio is significantly riskier than their prior loser 
stocks portfolio, losing stocks earn about 25 percent more than winning stocks over the subsequent three years. 
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the pressure that some security analysts face to release positive recommendations. This 
pressure is related to analysts who work for firms that also have an investment banking 
function. In fact, analysts’ compensation from their corporate finance arm in investment 
banking firms is one of the main explanations in the literature for analysts’ optimistic 
behaviour. Analysts’ working environments and their incentives can lead to several 
distortions. According to Michaely and Womack (2005), investment banks traditionally have 
three income sources that may potentially create conflicts of interest within the bank and 
with its clients: 1) corporate financing, the issue of securities and merger advisory services; 
2) brokerage services and 3) proprietary trading. Some of the main potential conflicts are 
between the two first sources. The first is responsible primarily  for completing transactions 
for new and current clients, and the second for maximizing commissions and spreads by 
providing timely, high quality and presumably unbiased information to their clients. 
Many security analysts who work for full-service brokerage firms are partly compensated 
based on the brokerage commissions they generate (Konrad and Greising, 1989). 
Therefore, this compensat ion works as an incentive to release favourable recommendations 
instead of unfavourable ones. As Espahbodi et al. (2001) argue, by issuing an optimistic 
forecast for a company, the firm’s brokers can call investors to buy that company’s stock 
and thus receive brokerage commissions. By issuing pessimistic forecasts, the commissions 
generated are lower for the firm due to restrictions on short sales and the limited 
availability and greater risk for options. In this context, Carleton et al. (1998) argue that 
brokerage firms tend to be significantly more optimistic in predicting future investment 
performance than non-brokerage houses. In fact, brokerage houses and investment banks 
employ most of the analysts. 
Analysts’ need to maintain good relations with the management of the firms they follow is 
pointed to as another incentive to optimism. Lim (2001) and Das et al. (1998) argue that 
analysts’ optimism can be explained by their need to gain increased access to information 
from management. In fact, analysts depend on corporate management for accurate and 
timely information about the companies they follow. Companies use this dependency as a 
weapon against analysts who issue negative opinions on their stock (Espahbodi et al., 
2001). On the other hand, optimism seems to be more pronounced for companies that 
have more uncertain information environments and for analysts who are more dependent 
on management access as a source of company information (Lim, 2001). 
By issuing negative recommendations, analysts are not only potentially reducing their 
access to the firm but also reducing the possibility of their investment banking firm doing 
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business with that firm in the future. Dugar and Nathan (1995) state that earnings 
forecasts made by analysts working for brokerage firms that have an investment banking 
relationship with a company are significantly more optimistic than those made by  other 
analysts working for firms without this relation. Since analysts’ reputations are also 
important in their financial compensation, and since this  depends on the quality of their 
recommendations, analysts have to strike a balance between their helpfulness to corporate 
finance professionals and their external reputation. 
2.2.3.3. Other explanations 
The finance literature advocates that analysts tend to compare themselves with one 
another, exhibiting herding behaviour.22 Generally, herding behaviour can be defined as 
individuals using a consensus opinion to modify their private beliefs (Cote and Sanders, 
1997). In the earnings estimation context, herding refers to the tendency of forecasters to 
“shade” or move their published earnings forecasts toward those of their colleagues (Olsen, 
1996). Beckers et al. (2004) present a review of the academic research findings related to 
herding behaviour among security analysts: 
1. The tendency to herd the consensus increases with the number of estimates close 
to the consensus and with the inaccuracy of one’s own past estimates (Stickel, 
1990; Graham, 1999); 
2. Older analysts are more likely to produce forecasts that deviate from the 
consensus, and conversely, younger analysts are typically less bold than their older 
counterparts (Hong et al., 2000); 
3. The tendency to herd has no relationship to the accuracy of the consensus forecast 
(Welch, 2000); 
4. Herding increases with earnings unpredictability (Olsen, 1996). 
 
Shiller (1995) suggests that herding can be observed in several contexts, but it is more 
exposed when the decision-making is complex and limited by time, information and ability. 
Cote and Sanders (1997) argue that forecasters display those characteristics when 
producing corporate earnings forecasts. If these forecasts are affected by herding, 
estimates can become biased and can lead to suboptimal investment decisions. In 
                                                 
22 See e.g., Trueman (1994) and Olsen (1996).  
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particular, herding can also create inaccuracy in published earnings estimates (Olsen, 
1996). 
In fact, one of most frequently mentioned scenarios for herding behaviour is the purchase 
recommendations for individual stocks by security analysts (Welch, 2000). Trueman (1994) 
and Olsen (1996) argue that the tendency to comparison can lead to risk aversion, and 
that such risk averse behaviour causes herding. One possible explanation for this situation 
is that analysts’ compensation may be determined by comparison with other analysts’ 
forecasts, rather than accuracy. Olsen (1996) justifies this possibility by the difficulty in 
measuring the quality of earnings estimates given the large random component in 
earnings. 
2.3. The going-concern assumption 
Financial statements are the privileged information vehicle between companies and their  
stakeholders. A non-standard audit report regarding the financial statements is not 
desirable and, in particular, a going-concern modified audit firm report is perceived by the 
market as a clear signal of bad news. If the auditor develops serious doubts about the 
continuity of the entity being audited in the foreseeable future, the going-concern 
assumption comes under question and his or her audit report suffers a GCM.23 
2.3.1. Historical background24 
SAP No.15, issued in 1942, represents the AICPA’s first formal effort to consider the effects 
of uncertainties on the audit report (Bell and Wright, 1995). That statement suggests that 
the cumulative effect of uncertainties may be so great as to create a situation either in 
which an auditor’s report might require an exception, or in which it might not be possible 
to render an opinion. After that, the Securities and Exchange Commission’s Accounting 
Series Release (ASR) No. 90 (1962), and the AICPA’s SAP No.33 (1963) required that the 
phrase “subject to” be used to introduce a qualification of opinion when the financial 
statements were materially affected by uncertainties. The need for going-concern 
disclosure was first recognized in SAS No. 2 (AICPA 1974), since the Auditing Standards 
Executive Committee concluded that uncertainty about the ability of an entity to continue 
should be reported in the same manner as any other uncertainty. Since then, SAS No. 34 
                                                 
23 The going-concern assumption is one of the most important in accounting, indicating that the accounts are drawn up 
on the basis that the business will continue in existence for the foreseeable future. 
24 This section benefits from the contents of the CPA’s journal site. For further details, see 
http://www.nysscpa.org/cpajournal.  
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(AICPA 1981) and SAS No. 59 (AICPA 1988) have provided guidelines for the independent 
auditor’s evaluation and disclosure of going-concern problems. 
SAS No. 34 entitled “The Auditor’s Consideration When a Question Arises about an Entity’s 
Continued Existence” accepts the premise that audit reports should be modified for going-
concern uncertainties and provides operational guidance to auditors on assessing a client’s 
likely continued existence. This statement states that while an audit does not include a 
search for evidential matter relating to an entity’s continued existence, when an auditor 
becomes aware of information contrary to its continued existence, modification of the audit 
report might become necessary. Under SAS No. 34, the auditor had a passive responsibility 
in assessing an entity’s continued existence. That is, the auditor was required to assess the 
firm’s going-concern status only when contrary information was discovered during the audit 
of the financial statements. 
Through its long history, the requirement to disclose going-concern uncertainties has been 
controversial (Jones, 1996). For instance, in 1982, the AICPA proposed to eliminate this 
requirement, but public opposition led this proposal to fail. In fact, there were complaints 
about situations in which firms had gone bankrupt without any warning about going-
concern problems in the independent audit report. Despite the public support, the AICPA 
opposes the requirement of disclosure with the argument that the auditor’s evaluation of 
uncertainties is not superior to evaluations which statement users can make. However, the 
auditors’ opinion may provide useful information given their intimate knowledge of the 
client’s activities and future plans (Mutchler, 1985). 
In response to this public concern, AICPA issued the expectation gap standards, including 
SAS No. 59. Statement on Auditing Standards, “The Auditor's Consideration of an Entity's 
Ability to Continue as a Going Concern”. This statement requires auditors to evaluate 
whether substantial doubt exists about an audit client's ability to continue as a going-
concern for a reasonable period. Generally, this period does not exceed one year beyond 
the date of the financial statements being audited. SAS No. 59 increased auditors’ 
responsibilities since it requires an explicit evaluation of a company’s continued viability in 
every audit. The first stage in making this going-concern evaluation requires the 
consideration of whether the results of the audit procedures performed related to the 
various audit objectives identify existing conditions and events that indicate substantial 
doubt about the client's ability to continue as a going-concern. Those conditions and events 
are divided into four categories: 1) negative trends, 2) other indications of possible 
financial difficulties, 3) internal matters, and 4) external matters. 
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When, after considering conditions and events in the aggregate, the auditors believe that 
substantial doubt may exist, they should consider management's plans for dealing with the 
effects of those conditions and events. If, after considering the conditions and events and 
management's plans, the auditors conclude that substantial doubt remains, the audit report 
should include an explanatory paragraph to reflect this uncertainty. Alternatively, the 
auditors may choose to issue a disclaimer of opinion upon the financial statements.  
2.3.2. The informational content of the GCM for the market place 
Employing the capital-market paradigm, several studies test whether going-concern reports 
have information value for the market. Asare (1990) sees the particular importance of 
going-concern audit reports in two ways: the option of this opinion allows the auditor to 
force disclosures that might not otherwise be forthcoming, and the superior information 
access auditors have that is restricted for financial statement users. 
2.3.2.1. No information content 
Some studies question the audit qualifications and going-concern reports’ informational 
content to markets. Considering the case of audit qualifications in general, Ball et al. 
(1979) conclude that for the sample as a whole, there is an insignificant difference 
between the returns of qualified shares and the market. After dividing the sample in sub-
groups considering the type of audit qualification, they find that only one sub-group 
presents statistically significant abnormal returns. Contrary to their expectations, their 
results suggest that audit qualifications, considered as a single group, are not associated 
with a significant reduction in share prices. Davis (1982), who analyses the informational 
value of “subject to” opinions to market, presents similar results. In fact, he does not find 
informational value in the “subject to” group since there is no significant difference in the 
average impact in the stock prices compared with the control group that received 
unqualified opinions. However, he speculates that the lack of investor response may be 
due to the information impounded by other non-accounting sources of information prior to 
the release of the annual report. 
Elliott (1982) also fails to find a strong pattern of negative returns after the public 
announcement of the uncertainty, although some “subject to” opinions are associated with 
abnormal returns before the announcement. In addition, Dodd et al. (1984) analyse the 
association between stock price reaction and audit qualification announcements and 
conclude that there is little evidence of stock price effects after qualifications. However, 
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they find that the market anticipates such qualifications, because negative abnormal 
returns associated with firms suffering these occur from three to six months prior to the 
qualification announcement. For instance, in the case of the going-concerns, Dodd et al. 
(1984) find significant abnormal returns during the period of three to six months before the 
report. On the other hand, prior abnormal return magnitude depends on the type of 
qualification. 
2.3.2.2. Information content 
Despite the exceptions considered in the previous section, most of the studies addressing 
the informational content of qualified audit opinions, and specifically going-concern reports, 
show that those events have information content to users. One of the initial studies about 
the relation between audit reports and market reaction is that of Firth (1978). This study 
presents evidence that some types of audit qualification have a significant impact on 
market prices. In fact, investors react differently depending on the audit qualification type. 
Regarding going-concern reports, he finds significant negative price adjustments, which 
means that these reports contain significant information that investors use in their 
investment decisions. Chow and Rice (1982) extend Firth’s (1978) study controlling for the 
effects of earnings reports, firm size, auditor, industry and systematic risk. They compare 
the average three-month return using a market model with an industry factor to calculate 
firm-specific stock returns. Their results suggest that firms having an unqualified opinion 
present higher returns around the announcement period than those that had qualified 
opinions. 
Banks and Kinney (1982) reinforce the notion that uncertainty qualifications are associated 
with declines in stock prices. Frost (1991) replicates and extends Banks and Kinney’s study 
by examining the influence of several factors on the auditor’s decision using a larger 
sample and with a different period. She finds that Banks and Kinney’s (1982) results are 
robust to changes in the economic climate and the auditing environment. Dopuch et al. 
(1986) claim that media disclosures of qualified opinions are associated with significant 
negative stock price effects and the magnitude of the abnormal returns does not depend 
on whether or not the firm received a similar qualification in the previous year. Fields and 
Wilk ins (1991) also find evidence consistent with the importance of going-concern opinions, 
particularly for the going-concern withdrawn case. In fact, the results show that there is a 
significant increase in returns around public announcements of going-concern withdrawals. 
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More recently, Chen and Church (1996) and Holder-Webb and Wilkins (2000) find that 
bankrupt firms that previously received going-concern opinions experience lower negative 
excess returns in the period surrounding bankruptcy filings compared with others without 
the GCM. Chen and Church (1996) demonstrate that going-concern opinions reduce the 
surprise associated with bankruptcy even controlling for the probability of bankruptcy, the 
market’s reaction to news announcements prior to bankruptcy and changes in stock price 
prior to the issuance of the audit report. Holder-Webb and Wilkins (2000) find similar 
results by controlling for the predictability of bankruptcy filing, the macroeconomic 
environment, and firm-specific levels of financial distress. Together, these results posit that 
going-concern opinions have information value.  
2.4. Discussion of the problem and delimitation of boundaries 
The previous sections identify some of the main discussions in the two areas of the 
literature that I want to connect: analyst behaviour and going-concern opinions. The going-
concern assumption is one of the most important assumptions in accounting. The GCM 
paragraph is added to the audit report every time auditors develop serious doubts during 
the audit process about the ability of the firm to continue in the foreseeable future. On the 
other hand, the literature shows that the GCM produces strong negative market reaction 
around the event. For these reasons, a going-concern opinion represents an extreme case 
of bad news, and therefore security analysts should not be indifferent to it. 
Security analysts, as sophisticated agents in the market, should increase the volume of 
relevant information available in order to help investors in their investment decisions. 
Considering the analysts’ role in the market and the market impact of their outputs,25 it is 
reasonable to expect rational behaviour from analysts in the dissemination of information. 
As one relevant source of information to the markets, the analysis of going-concern 
opinions should also reflect this rational behaviour. However, there is evidence that 
analysts are not always rational in their judgements in several situations. Considering the 
price reaction to analysts’ opinions and going-concern reports, it is clear that these two 
issues have explanatory power regarding the market movements. However, it seems that 
these two areas of the literature do not “talk” to each other. In fact, considering the non-
systematic reading of the main papers in these two areas, it was not possible to find a 
study covering this issue. 
Schipper (1991) argues that it is important to study decision strategies in extreme cases 
since research suggests that optimism seems to be most pronounced in forecasts preceded 
                                                 
25 For more details, see sections 2.2.1 and 2.2.2.  
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by share price declines or earnings declines. This thought seems to justify by itself the 
importance of the connection between these two areas. In fact, the analysis of the key 
literature suggests that going-concern opinions are undoubtedly an extreme event 
preceded and followed by strong negative market reaction. However, at this moment this is 
not the only argument justifying this idea, and there seem to be other reasons justifying 
this connection. For instance, there is evidence that analysts tend to underreact in the 
presence of bad news and overreact in the presence of good news (e.g., Amir and 
Ganzach, 1998; Easterwood and Nutt, 1999). Therefore, since the GCM and GCM 
withdrawals constitute two clear cases of bad and good news respectively, it is possible to 
extend previous research by analysing whether analysts react asymmetrically to this 
information. Finally, since analysts are considered sophisticated agents with privileged 
information, it seems to be interesting to explore whether analysts have anticipation power 
regarding this event. Specifically, research on this domain can clarify whether analysts 
anticipate and how they respond to the going-concern event. 
Together, these arguments seem to justify conducting a systematic review of the literature 
to evaluate the viability of the connection between analyst behaviour and going-concern 
opinions. Such a systematic  review of the literature will allow a deeper understanding of 
the field and the identification of a research gap justifying further research in a doctoral 
study . However, the systematic review should be focused within a refined scope in order to 
produce useful results. Figure 2.1. establishes the boundaries of the systematic review. 
In addition to the area of analyst behaviour, the analysis of the key literature points to two 
other main areas that can offer important contributions to the understanding of the 
phenomenon: behavioural finance and market pricing. The growth of the behavioural 
finance area and the contributions offered in the understanding of some market 
phenomena seem to justify its inclusion in the analysis. In fact, there is evidence 
supporting the importance of psychological decision processes in the decision-making 
process. Consequently, behavioural finance can make an important contribution to explain 
analyst behaviour in this context. On the other hand, the price reaction to analysts’ 
opinions and going-concern reports implies that the analysis should not ignore the market 
pricing area. Therefore, market pricing can give a new insight to the discussion. 
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Figure 2.1.: Mapping the field 
Analyst Behaviour Market Pricing
GOING-CONCERN OPINIONS
Behavioural Finance
 
 
In sum, the systematic review will look at three different areas in the accounting and 
finance literature that can be used to analyse the going-concern opinion phenomenon from 
an analyst perspective: analyst behaviour, behavioural finance and market pricing.  
The key literature reviewed in this chapter constitutes the basis for the systematic review. 
In fact, this scoping study was crucial for a general understanding of the areas that I want 
to research as well as the definition of the boundaries of my project. The scoping study 
allowed me to find the key theories, concepts and ideas related to my project. Chapter 2 
provided the first step for the development of the systematic review process. The next 
chapter describes the methodology used to find the papers covering my refined scope. 
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CHAPTER 3 - METHODOLOGY 
 
Drawing on the review protocol that I wrote for my MRes paper, this section presents the 
methodology developed to implement a systematic review of my topic . There are minor 
changes to the review protocol that are justified to promote the improvement of the search 
strategy. This literature review is anchored in the systematic review approach that is briefly 
described in Tranfield et al. (2003). The systematic review process, which is conducted to 
avoid the weaknesses of the traditional “narrative” reviews, allows researchers to use an 
explicit method to identify, select and review the relevant studies related to the research 
topic. By doing that, researchers guarantee transparency in the review process.26  
3.1. The rationale of systematic literature review 
There is general agreement in the academic world that the literature review is crucial in the 
research process. The review process allows researchers to understand the research topic, 
namely what has already been done, how it has been researched, and what the key issues 
are. There are some aspects that should be considered during the literature review 
process.27 More than simply transcribe what other scholars are saying about the topic, 
reviewers must demonstrate integration, communication skills and open-mindedness. This 
means that reviewers must be able to connect ideas, theories and experiences and 
communicate their findings to others with clarity, consistency and coherence. 
One of the most important concerns in research is that its output can present something 
new to knowledge in the field. For the achievement of this purpose, it is essential that 
researchers have a perfect understanding of previous work, which can be achieved with a 
good literature review. The quality of this review varies considerably, depending on several 
factors. Hart (1998) defines quality as “appropriate breadth and depth, rigour and 
consistency, clarity and brevity, and effective analysis and synthesis; in other words, the 
use of the ideas in the literature to justify the particular approach to the topic, the selection 
of methods, and demonstrating that this research contributes something new.” 
Despite the need for quality reviews, Hart (1998) states that value judgements, opinions, 
moralizing and ideologues often influence the perspective that reviewers adopt, 
contributing to the bias presented in some literature reviews. Therefore, the richness of the 
                                                 
26 Tranfield et al. (2003) present a critique to traditional “narrative” reviews, highlighting that this approach can lead 
researchers to be biased and suffer from lack of rigour.  
27 Hart (1998) presents a good summary of these aspects.  
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literature review depends on the ability of reviewers to capture elements from different 
theories to form a new synthesis or to provide a new insight. 
Despite the importance of a good literature review, there is no agreement concerning the 
best methodology to manage this process. There are different methods that can be used to 
produce a review, but there is no such thing as the perfect review (Hart, 1998). However, 
there are processes that can help to avoid, or at least significantly reduce personal bias, 
and guarantee methodological rigour in the literature review. One of those processes is the 
systematic review of the literature, which has been developed in the medical sciences. The 
systematic review of the literature uses a replicable, scientific and transparent process in 
order to minimize bias in the process and to provide an audit trail of reviewers’ decisions, 
procedures and conclusions. Literature review is considered a key tool in management 
research since it is used to manage the diversity of knowledge (Tranfield et al., 2003). For 
all these reasons, my literature review consists of a systematic review process that is 
schematically described in figure 1.  
Figure 3.1.: Systematic review procedure 
Stage 1: Planing the review
Step 1 - Forming a review panel
Step 2 - Mapping your field of study
Step 3 - Producing a review protocol
Stage 2: Identifying and evaluating studies
Step 4 - Conducting a systematic search
Step 5 - Evaluating studies
Stage 3: Extracting and synthesising data
Step 6 - Conducting data extraction
Step 7 - Conducting data synthesis
Stage 4: Reporting
Step 8 - Reporting the findings
Stage 5: Utilising the findings
Step 9 - Informing research
Step 10  - Informing practice
 
Source: AMRC, Cranfield University 
3.2. Systematic review aims 
Considering that I am connecting two literature areas that have been developed 
separately , I focus on the issues that can be linked in order to build a strong theoretical 
framework for my arguments. The systematic review process is essential to ensure 
transparency in this process. Therefore, I intend to compile accurate and consistent 
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bibliographies and summarize key ideas with a critical perspective. The main objectives of 
this dissertation are to: 
1. Understand and clarify the relationships between my research and the related 
areas in the literature; 
2. Position and justify my research within these areas; 
3. Understand the existing literature and how it relates/supports/contradicts my topic; 
4. Identify a research gap and research questions. 
3.3. Systematic review process 
3.3.1. Consultation group 
My systematic review of the literature is not exclusively a personal project. Although it is 
mainly an individual effort, the final work is also the result of the involvement of people 
who manifested interest  during this process. I am convinced that the final work benefited 
from the contribution of several people (see table 3.1.) who constitute my consultation 
group. 
Table 3.1.: Consultation group composition 
Person Title Organization Role in the review
Richard Taffler
Professor of Accounting and 
Finance
Cranfield School of Management Supervisor
Vineet Agarwal Research Fellow Cranfield School of Management Advisor for finance issues & panel 
member
Asad Kausar PhD Student Cranfield School of Management
Advisor for going-concern literature 
issues
Thabang Mokoaleli-Mokoteli PhD Student Cranfield School of Management Advisor for analyst literature issues
Duarte Trigueiros Professor of Accounting and 
Finance
Faculty of Economics - University 
of Algarve
External advisor for accounting and 
finance issues
David Denyer Senior Research Fellow Cranfield School of Management
Advisor for systematic review 
methodology & panel member
Heather Woodfield
Social Sciences Information 
Specialist
Cranfield University Advisor for literature search
 
 
My main inspiration is Prof. Richard Taffler, who helped me to identify a topic that I am 
comfortable with and at the same time, contributes to the development of research in the 
finance and accounting group. As my supervisor, I have had regular meetings with him 
since the first week I arrived at Cranfield and his supervision has been crucial to find the 
correct direction for my research. 
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I also benefited from the involvement of Prof. Taffler’s PhD students, such as Mr. Asad 
Kausar and Ms. Thabang Mokoaleli-Mokoteli, who offered some hours of their time to 
clarify and debate issues related to my project and with the field in general. These two 
colleagues have been very important for the development of my work, since for the past 
four years they have been undertaking research in going-concern and investment analyst 
behaviour respectively, which are the two main foci of my research. 
As an experienced researcher in finance, Dr. Vineet Agarwal has helped me during these 
few last months. His support before the Student Presentation Seminar and the 
contributions made during the MRes paper discussion have positively influenced my work. 
As an external academic, I involved Prof. Duarte Trigueiros because he is a specialist in the 
field and because he has a vast amount of related research experience. Prof. Trigueiros is a 
very important source of motivation for me since he was my MSc supervisor and he is the 
Head of the Management Group of the university where I am a lecturer. He is very closely 
involved with my project and I have regular contact with him by e-mail, and personally, 
when I go to Portugal. 
Besides the involvement of specialists in accounting and finance, I felt the need for 
guidance in the systematic review process and in the literature search. The MRes sessions 
in the systematic review and literature search processes provided by Dr. David Denyer and 
Ms. Heather Woodfield respectively have helped me considerably in understanding the 
importance of this process and how to use important research tools. These two advisors 
always manifested available to answer my concerns via e-mail or personally, when I asked 
for help. 
3.3.2. Description of search strategy 
The search strategy is a critical step in the systematic review, since it  delimits the subject 
topic. I followed two stages in the filtering process: the first is based on the reading of 
titles and abstracts of articles located in the electronic databases, and the second on the 
reading of full papers. My choice to restrict my literature search to journal articles is 
justified since they represent the most important source of information for doctoral studies, 
offering a relatively concise and up-to-date format for research. 
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3.3.2.1. Definition of keywords and search strings 
The systematic search is undertaken in citation databases by the use of various keywords 
combined in search strings. The definition of keywords and search strings is essential as 
they are responsible for the identification of the studies extracted. The scoping study  made 
in chapter 2 facilitated the definition of the keywords to use in the search strings. 
Considering the importance of this step, the participation of the panel members, 
particularly my supervisor, was essential to guarantee a comprehensive list of keywords. 
Table 3.2. presents those keywords, divided by the three main areas of the literature in 
which I focused my review (analyst behaviour, behavioural finance and market pricing) and 
the event that I am looking at (going-concern opinion). 
Table 3.2.: Keyword search 
Subject Keywords Subject Keywords
analyst behaviour behavioural finance
analyst behavior behavioral finance
rationality optimism
forecasts overconfidence
recommendations underreaction
coverage overreaction
news bias
announcements heuristic
incentives representativeness
performance herding
going-concern
going-concern opinion market reaction
going-concern modifiction price reaction
going-concern withdrawal market price
qualified opinion abnormal return
going-concern assumption
expectation
Behavioural finance
Market pricingGoing-concern opinion
Analyst behaviour
 
The keywords lead to the definition of five search strings that are used in the database 
search. The combination of keywords using Boolean operators (“AND” and “OR”) is the key 
for the final size of the sample. The search strings must not be too broad or too narrow in 
order to allow the selection of a manageable number of papers that will cover the main 
aspects of my research.  
Search string 1: 
(analyst* AND behavio*) AND (rationality OR forecast* OR recommendation* OR coverage 
OR incentives OR performance OR news OR announcements); 
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Search string 2: 
analyst* AND (going AND concern OR qualification) AND (opinion* OR modification OR 
withdrawal OR assumption); 
Search string 3: 
analyst* AND (behavio* finance OR optimism OR overconfidence OR underreaction OR 
overreaction OR bias* OR heuristic OR representativeness OR herding); 
Search string 4: 
analyst* AND (market reaction OR abnormal returns OR price reaction OR market price OR 
rationality); 
Search string 5: 
((going AND concern) OR qualification*) AND (reaction OR abnormal returns OR rationality 
OR expectation*). 
 
The first search string28 selects the papers that connect analyst behaviour with some of 
their outputs, like forecasts or recommendations, and associated performance. Given that 
the literature concerning security analysts constitutes a very broad area, this string restricts 
the selected papers to those that cover only issues that connect analysts’ behaviour with 
important topics identified during the scoping study. These topics involve coverage, 
rationality and incentives faced by analysts in a behavioural context. 
The second search string restricts the selection to papers that link the analyst literature 
with the going-concern literature. To be more specific, this string will restrict the search for 
connection between analysts and going-concern opinions, GCM, GCM and going-concern 
assumptions. 
The third search string identifies papers that look at the analyst literature from a 
behavioural finance perspective. Given the fact that behavioural finance is a very broad 
area, the search is restricted to relevant topics identified in the scoping study that have 
direct linkage with analysts’ behaviour. Such topics are optimism, overconfidence, 
underreaction, overreaction, bias, heuristic, representativeness or herding. 
The fourth search is looking at papers that analyse market price reaction, abnormal returns 
or the market price associated with the work of analysts. Given that analysts’ outputs have 
                                                 
28 The asterisks will allow the inclusion of singular, plural, possessive words and non-possessive cases. 
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market impact, it is important to analyse papers that cover this issue. It also identifies 
papers that analyse the degree of rationality of their work, which is one of the main 
discussions in my work. 
The last search string selects papers that link audit qualifications in general, and going-
concern opinions in particular, with market reaction and abnormal returns, in order to 
analyse the importance of these qualifications to the market. Rationality and expectations 
constitute the other topics that are linked with audit qualifications in order to cover these 
important issues in this context. 
The above search strings are used in the selected citation databases regarding titles and 
abstracts of academic papers since they summarise and highlight the major points covered 
in the studies. Abstracts are expected to concisely describe the content, scope, 
methodology, findings and conclusions of these papers. 
3.3.2.2. Database search 
Several databases can be used as citation databases. Among the possible sources, 
accounting and finance research can be developed using databases like ProQuest, EBSCO, 
Social Science Citation Index, Emerald (produced by MCB Press) or Science Direct 
(produced by Elsevier). All these databases present a collection of academic journals that 
can be searched. However, most of the journals contained in each database are also 
available in others. Therefore, with the help of the panel, I chose to work with three main 
databases, which together cover a high number of academic journals. The three databases 
are: 
1. ProQuest 
2. EBSCO 
3. Social Science Citation Index 
3.3.2.3. Other information sources 
The systematic review is based solely on scholarly journals accessible in the citation 
databases. Despite the importance of other information sources, like working papers, 
books, conference papers or thesis, the systematic search among these sources is not 
possible since there are no comprehensive databases for them. However, it is possible to 
find some good pieces of work in these sources that might be important in my review, 
although impossible to search systematically . 
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This is particularly important for working papers since they represent the most recent 
contributions to research. It is possible to conduct such a search in web sites that contain 
working papers. For example , the main authors usually list recent works that are being 
developed in their personal pages, and the Social Science Research Network constitutes 
the most important source of working papers in the accounting and finance area. However, 
these sources are not comprehensive since they contain only a restricted number of 
working papers. On the other hand, the quality assessment regarding the working papers 
is also a concern since, unlike the published papers, working papers have not been 
rigorously reviewed by experts in the field. Nevertheless, considering the importance of the 
working papers and the suggestions made by the review panel in my MRes review 
presentation, I decided to include working papers in my review. Another important 
suggestion made by the review panel during my MRes review presentation, which I will 
consider, is related to cross-references. Although this procedure is not systematic, it can 
help to identify seminal papers omitted in the systematic search for my review because it is 
impossible to guarantee that a database or a procedure will find all the relevant papers. 
Finally, I also considered studies suggested by the panel. 
3.3.3. Selection criteria 
The sources of information described in previous sections present the approach to 
identifying the first tranche of studies for my review. However, considering that I use three 
different databases to run the same search strings, it is necessary to eliminate the 
duplications. Additionally, since the database search is exclusively based on titles and 
abstracts, it is expected that most of the papers identified will be out of my refined scope. 
Therefore, it is necessary to establish exclusion criteria based on the reading of the titles 
and abstracts for a first trial. The next step is related to the exclusion of certain papers, 
based on a reading of the full papers. 
3.3.3.1. Elimination of duplications 
Considering that the search strings are applied to three different databases that contain 
common scholarly journals, it is necessary to eliminate all the duplicate references. In 
order to do that, I used ProCite’s functionality to identify the duplicated studies. First, I 
identif ied duplications by aggregating the output of each search string. Second, I identified 
duplicates by aggregating the references identified in all search strings. This procedure 
allows the construction of a comprehensive database without duplications. 
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3.3.3.2. Exclusion criteria based on the reading of titles and abstracts 
After identifying the papers selected by the search strings without duplications, it is 
necessary to exclude papers that are out of the defined scope. The objective of this first 
trial is to eliminate all the papers that, for different reasons, do not fit within the defined 
scope. Table 3.3. presents the criteria for exclusion based on a reading of the titles and 
abstracts, and the corresponding rationale. In order to implement these criteria it is 
necessary to print, using ProCite, all the titles and abstracts of those papers. Table 3.3. 
shows the three main reasons for the exclusion. I defined sub-criteria for the third set of 
exclusion criteria since these papers could be useful in future. The papers that are 
excluded based on these criteria could be important for future research in this area if I 
were to enlarge the scope of the research. Therefore, I kept these references in a database 
for possible future use. 
Table 3.3.: Criteria and rationale for exclusion 
Rationale
1.
Analysts and going-concern opinions are two subjects often
mentioned in the media and other sources than scholarly
journals. Since this is a systematic review for academic
research, I will exclude magazines, trade publications and
newspapers. I will also exclude these since I can not search
systematically for them.
2.
In some cases, the combination of some keywords can lead the
search to papers in other areas than accounting and finance or
papers that mention the defined keywords as residual issues.
In these cases, I will exclude them since that is not my focus.
3.1. Behavioural finance issues not related with financial analysts
There are several topics in behavioural finance that can be
applied to other market agents rather than financial analysts.
Since my focus is in the financial analysts issues, I will exclude
all the studies in this situation.
3.2. Financial sector and utilities studies
Financial sector firms have different characteristics compared
with other sectors, namely accounting, financial indicators or
regulation. Usually, this sector is treated separately in
accounting and finance studies given these specific
characteristics. For similar reasons, I will also exclude studies
based on utilities.
3.3.
Studies based on other 
markets than Europe, United 
States and Japan
Europe, US and Japan markets are the largest and most
developed in the world. Since studies based in other markets
are residual and my research will use US data, I will exclude
studies using other markets.
3.4.
Studies using analysts' 
forecasts as proxy for market 
earnings expectations in other 
contexts 
Analysts’ forecasts are used as a proxy for market earnings
expectations in other contexts than analysts behaviour. Since I
will be focusing on analyst behaviour, I will exclude all these
studies.
3.5. Other reasons
The systematic review is based on a very refined scope in
order to cover issues that have direct impact with my research.
Therefore, all the studies that not present that close relation
and cover a broader scope will be eliminated.
Studies that mention the defined keywords as residual 
issues or in other contexts than accounting and finance
Articles published in other sources than scholarly 
journals 
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3.3.3.3. Exclusion criteria based on the reading of full text papers 
The next step in the selection process involves full text reading. After the first trials, the 
remaining papers are tested against the theoretical, empirical and methodological criteria 
defined below. This last step allows the definition of the key papers for my research before 
the exclusion based on quality criteria. 
 
Theoretical papers must contain: 
1. Clear and self-contained description of the research problem or issue; 
2. Motivation for the study of the problem; 
3. Current state of understanding of the problem; 
4. Assumptions and development of a new theoretical model to explain the problem; 
5. Discussion of the theoretical model’s contribution. 
 
Empirical papers must contain: 
1. Literature review justifying the research questions; 
2. Definitions of the hypotheses; 
3. Clear description of the methodology; 
4. Clear definition of the sample (time window, place of the study, sample size); 
5. Discussion of the data analysis and results; 
6. Results interpretation in the context of the research question. 
 
Methodological papers must contain: 
1. Clear definition of a methodology; 
2. Discussion of the methodological assumptions. 
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3.3.3.4. Exclusion criteria based on quality criteria 
The last step in the trial is related to the quality evaluation of the studies that successfully 
pass through the other filtrat ions. All the studies that successfully passed the exclusion 
criteria involving a reading of titles and abstracts and a reading of full text will be tested 
against the quality criteria defined in table 3.4. 
Table 3.4.: Numerical approach to quality assessment 
0 - Absence 1 - Low 2 - Medium 3 - High Not applicable
Contribution
The article does not 
provide enough 
information to 
assess this criteria
The paper adds little 
to the body of 
knowledge in this 
area
Contribution to 
knowledge is trivial 
in importance and 
significance
Significant addition 
to current knwledge; 
Fill na important 
theory gap
This element is not 
applicable to this 
paper
Theory
The article does not 
provide enough 
information to 
assess this criteria
Literature review is 
inadequate; Failure 
to motivate study 
with practical 
implications; No 
unserlying economic 
story
Theoretical base is 
acceptable; Having 
practical rationales 
for study in some 
extent
Excellent review of 
prior literature; 
Strong theoretical 
basis; Study has 
important 
implications for 
practitioners
This element is not 
applicable to this 
paper
Methodology
The article does not 
provide enough 
information to 
assess this criteria
The idea of study is 
poorly executed; 
Inappropriate 
quantitative 
methods; Failure to 
justify proxies for 
economic variables
Justified research 
design; Acceptable 
proxies for economic 
variables; The idea 
of study is not fully 
executed
Research design 
adequately examine 
the theoretical 
argument; Proxies 
are adequately 
defined
This element is not 
applicable to this 
paper
Data Analysis
The article does not 
provide enough 
information to 
assess this criteria
Data sample 
insufficiency. Weak 
connection between 
statistical results and 
economic story; 
Inconclusive 
statistics
Appropriate data 
sample. Statistical 
results relates to 
economic story; 
Adequate statistics 
but inadequate 
explanation
Adequate data 
sample; Statistical 
results support 
theoretical 
arguments; Well 
explained statistics; 
Include limitation 
analysis
This element is not 
applicable to this 
paper
LevelElements to 
consider
 
Source: Marcos, J. (2002). 
The measures for evaluating the quality of the studies are based on the systematic review 
lectures, where criteria for the evaluating papers were discussed. I used a numerical 
approach to assess the quality of the papers (table 3.4.), which was developed in the 
Cranfield School of Management and was presented during the selecting and appraising 
studies session. This numerical approach was developed by Marcos (2002) and presents a 
concise and generic approach to evaluate the quality of studies based on the following 
criteria: 
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1. Contribution; 
2. Theory; 
3. Methodology; 
4. Data analysis. 
 
The quality level is scaled as zero (absence), one (low), two (medium) and three (high) for 
each of the four elements defined. “Not applicable” is used when the element is not 
applicable. All the papers that have two scores below two are excluded from the final 
sample. 
3.3.4. Data extraction process 
The final sample of papers is made up of those that passed the selection criteria described 
in the previous sections. These papers are the references for my systematic review. I 
conducted an extraction process of the papers containing citation, methodological, 
thematic and quality assessment information in order to compile a rich database. Table 3.5. 
present an example of data extraction form. 
The main information (author, title, journal, date of publication, abstract and keywords) 
about the papers identified during the database search are imported into ProCite before 
the selection criteria, since it is necessary to read all the titles and abstracts at the first 
stage. For the papers that passed the criterion based on a reading of the titles and 
abstracts, it is necessary to import the pdf file in order to determine whether they also pass 
the criterion based on a reading of the full paper and the quality assessment. To the 
papers that constitute the final sample, it is necessary to type in all the missing information 
manually , since the information imported from the databases is not comprehensive. 
Information relating to all the remain ing papers and working papers are input manually. 
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Table 3.5.: Example of data extraction form 
General Description  
Author Name: Taffler, R. // Lu, J. // Kausar, A. 
Article Title: In denial? Stock market underreaction to going-concern audit report 
disclosures 
Journal Title: Journal of Accounting & Economics 
Author Affiliation: Cranfield University 
Publication Date: 2004 
Volume: 38 
Page Numbers: 263-296 
Research Category: Empirical 
Study Location: UK 
Data Description: 108 non-finance firms with first-time GCM (1995-2000) 
Quality Assessment  
Contribution: 3 
Theory: 3 
Methodology: 3 
Data Analysis: 3 
Include (Yes/No) Yes 
Exclusion Reason - 
 
 
 
 
Abstract: 
We investigate the stock price reaction to UK going-concern audit report 
disclosures in the calendar year subsequent to publication. Over this period 
our firm population underperforms by between 24% and 31% depending on 
the benchmark adopted. This market underreaction to such an 
unambiguous bad news release is not a post -earnings announcement drift 
phenomenon; it is also robust to other potentially confounding explanations. 
However, whatever the reason for such stock mispricing, we find costly 
arbitrage prevents rational investors forcing prices back into line with 
fundament al value. Our reselts have implications for the market’s ability to 
impound bad news appropriately and the incompleteness of arbitrage in 
such small “loser” firm situations. 
Keywords: Market anomalies; Investor biases; Behavioural finance; Limits to arbit rage. 
Motivation: Investigate the stock price reaction to UK going-concern audit report 
disclosures in the calendar year subsequent to publication. 
 
 
Findings: 
Ø Evidence that market takes time to assimilate bad news; 
Ø Results suggest that market underreact s to going-concern 
modifications after the release of those reports; 
Ø Results show that the market underreaction is not a post-earnings 
announcement drift phenomenon; 
Ø Costly arbitrage prevents rational investors forcing prices back into 
line with fundamental value. 
Additional Information  
Related papers: Kausar et al. (2004) 
Location of item: C:\Documents and Settings\Administrador\Os meus 
documentos\Database\Journal of Accounting & Economics\ Taffler et al. 
(2004).pdf 
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3.3.5. Literature synthesis process 
The last step in the systematic review is to synthesise the selected papers into a connected 
whole. Indeed, this process is crucial in order to understand the research topic  and to 
identify connections and patterns within the literature. Moreover, it might help to clearly 
identify the gap in the literature and to refine the initial research questions. 
Accordingly, I designed a literature tree in order to map out the structure of my research 
topic. Analyst behaviour and the going-concern topics constitute the starting points of this 
structure, which will allow the identification and the connection of theories, ideas and 
results. Given that my topic consists of the connection of two different areas, particular 
emphasis is given to the issues that can be linked. The other main purpose will be the 
identification of connections between papers, which is essential to the definition of the 
“connected whole”. 
More specifically, some questions will lead my systematic review. These questions 
represent my guideline during the synthesis of the selected papers that constitute my 
review: 
1. What do we already know in the areas related to my research topic? 
2. What are the characteristics of the key concepts? 
3. What are the relationships between these key concepts? 
4. What are the existing theories? 
5. Where are there inconsistencies in existing knowledge? 
6. What alternatives can be tested? 
7. How can my research contribute to a better understanding of my research 
question? 
8. What are the strengths and weaknesses of the available methods? 
This chapter described the methodology used to conduct my systematic review. The next 
chapter presents the descriptive analysis of the selected papers and the report of the 
findings in the form of a thematic analysis. Finally, it discusses main ideas extracted from 
the process. 
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CHAPTER 4 - FINDINGS 
 
This chapter presents the findings extracted from the systematic review process. It  has the 
objective of facilitating the reader’s understanding of the research by synthesizing the 
papers that successfully met the criteria defined in the methodology and which constitute 
the final sample. The chapter is divided into two main sections. First, I present a 
descriptive analysis of the selected literature by aggregating papers using simple sets of 
categories. This description allows an understanding of the main characteristics associated 
with the papers, in terms of authors, journals and age of the articles. Second, the findings 
are reported to present a thematic analysis of the research that has been done within the 
defined scope that I am using to ground my research. This critical analysis of the findings 
is crucial in order to justify my topic, refine my research questions and construct a 
theoretical argument for the development of the research. 
4.1. Descriptive analysis of the selected papers 
This section briefly describes the process defined by the methodology. It also presents a 
descriptive analysis of the selected studies analysed in the systematic review of the 
literature. 
4.1.1. Process description 
The application of the search strings in the three databases defined in the methodology 
enables the first stage of documents selection. Table 4.1. reviews the number of 
documents extracted from each database. 
Table 4.1.: Number of documents by search string and database 
Proquest EBSCO SSCI TOTAL
All Sources 294 162 N/A 456
Academic journals 102 117 131 350
All Sources 19 4 N/A 23
Academic journals 3 3 1 7
All Sources 2.285 693 N/A 2.978
Academic journals 268 252 223 743
All Sources 1.007 301 N/A 1.308
Academic journals 193 169 76 438
All Sources 980 276 N/A 1.256
Academic journals 100 108 90 298
All Sources 4.585 1.436 N/A 6.021
Academic journals 666 649 521 1.836
Search String 5
TOTAL
Search String 1
Search String 2
Search String 3
Search String 4
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Table 4.1. shows that there is a massive number of documents available in each database. 
The total number of documents considering all the databases is 6,021. However, since the 
systematic review is only based on academic papers, I separated the academic journals 
from other sources in the database search. The number of academic papers in the three 
databases is 1,836. The next step consists of the elimination of duplications using ProCite, 
as the three databases contain common scholarly journals. This procedure eliminates 623 
papers between the three databases, which means that I have to apply the exclusion 
criteria based on the reading of titles and abstracts to 1,213 papers. 
The title and the abstract of each of the 1,213 papers were crossed with the exclusion 
criteria defined in the methodology chapter. The results are presented in table 4.2. 
Table 4.2.: Selection of papers process 
Documents from all sources 6.021
Other sources than academic papers -4.185
Academic papers 1.836
Duplications -623
Academic papers after duplication removal 1.213
Papers excluded based on criterion 1 -21
Papers excluded based on criterion 2 -866
Papers related with my reseach 326
Papers excluded based on criterion 3.1 -6
Papers excluded based on criterion 3.2 -6
Papers excluded based on criterion 3.3 -12
Papers excluded based on criterion 3.4 -9
Papers excluded based on criterion 3.5 -251
Papers included in my refined scope 42
Papers excluded based on the reading of full text -6
Papers excluded based on quality criteria -2
Papers selected based on the methodology 34
Papers included based on the cross-references 4
Papers included based on panel suggestions 2
Final sample of papers for the systematic review 40  
Despite being classified as academic papers, 21 documents were removed due to deficient 
classification in the databases. These documents were interviews, biographies and other 
situations. A high number of papers were also excluded because they cover areas other 
than accounting and finance, or cover residual issues. This criterion finds 866 studies in 
those conditions. Therefore, I considered 326 papers related to my topic that could be 
useful for the development of my current and future research. For that reason, I exported 
these 326 references to ProCite for future use. The other 284 papers were excluded given 
the refined scope defined for my systematic review. Table 4.2. separates the third 
exclusion criteria by specific reasons based on the methodology. 
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The full reading of the 42 selected papers leads to reject 6 empirical papers based on the 
empirical criteria defined for the reading of full text papers. Additionally , the application of 
the quality criteria excluded two more papers that did not pass the numerical approach to 
quality assessment. Consequently, the final number of papers selected based on the 
methodology defined in Chapter 3 is 34. Considering the suggestions made by the panel in 
the MRes review, I also included four papers based on the cross-references and two papers 
suggested by the panel members. The search for working papers, also suggested during 
the MRes review, allow the inclusion of one study, which is one of the two suggested by 
the panel. As a result, the final number of papers to consider in the systematic review of 
the literature is 40. 
4.1.2. Descriptive statistics 
The objective of this section is to provide the descriptive analysis of the papers by using a 
simple set of categories with the use of extraction forms. The 40 papers included in my 
literature review have different characteristics, which are briefly described in the following 
tables.29 Table 4.3. presents the list of the 40 papers included in the systematic review, 
which reveal a high heterogeneity of authors.30 
Table 4.3.: List of papers included in the systematic review of the literature 
1. Abarbanell and Bernard (1992) 21. Hodgkinson (2001)
2. Ackert and Hunter (1994) 22. Hong and Kubik (2003)
3. Ackert and Hunter (1995) 23. Huberts and Fuller (1995)
4. Ameen et al. (1994) 24. Jones (1996)
5. Amir and Ganzach (1998) 25. Kausar et al. (2004)
6. Asare (1990) 26. Lim (2001)
7. Asquith et al. (2005) 27. Löffler (1998)
8. Beckers et al. (2004) 28. Loudder et al. (1992)
9. Blay and Geiger (1995) 29. McNichols et al. (1997)
10. Brown (1997) 30. Michaely and Womack (1999)
11. Capstaff et al. (1995) 31. Moses (1990)
12. Cote and Goodstein (1999) 32. Mutchler (1985)
13. Das (1998) 33. O'Hanlon and Whiddett (1991)
14. De Bondt and Forbes (1999) 34. Rubinstein (2001)
15. De Bondt and Thaler (1990) 35. Sedor (2002)
16. Ding et al. (2004) 36. Stevens and Williams (2004)
17. Dugar and Nathan (1995) 37. Taffler et al. (2004)
18. Easterwood and Nutt (1999) 38. Tamura (2002)
19. Espahbodi et al. (2001) 39. Trueman (1994)
20. Ho and Harris (2000) 40. Welch (2000)  
                                                 
29 A summary of the 40 selected papers can be found in appendix 1.  
30 Mutchler (1985), Moses (1990), Loudder et al. (1992) and Espahbodi et al. (2001) were selected using cross-
references. Asare (1990) and Kausar et al. (2004) were selected based on panel suggestion. All the remaining were 
selected using the search strategy. 
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Figure 4.1. shows that the papers analysed are published from 1985 to date. There is no 
special tendency in the age profile, but 75 percent of the papers analysed were published 
after 1995, which seems to indicate the current interest in the topic.  
Figure 4.1.: Age profile of the papers 
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Table 4.4. aggregates the studies by discipline, journal title and projected quality, grading 
for the papers’ journals. The aggregation is based on the “Journal Recommendations for 
Academic Publication” edited by Cranfield School of Management. The analysis of table 4.4 
shows that most of the papers are classified in just one area of knowledge. In fact, 86.5 
percent of the classified papers are included in the finance and accounting discipline, which 
is not unexpected considering the refined scope defined for my systematic review. The 
systematic review also includes four papers classified in the economics and decision science 
disciplines and one paper classified in the corporate social responsibility discipline. The 
other two academic papers are not classified in the Journal Recommendations for 
Academic Publications, nor is the working paper. The analysis of the studies by journal title 
indicates that there are only three journals with more than three papers in the systematic 
review. Financial Analysts Journal is the most important source with five studies, followed 
by the Journal of Accounting, Auditing & Finance and the Journal of Finance with four 
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studies each. The analysis of the projected quality grading31 measure indicates that 37.8 
percent of the papers included in the systematic review are classified as “Top international 
quality” and only 5.4 percent are classified as “Lower national quality”, which seems to 
indicate a high-quality level in the papers analysed. 
Table 4.4.: Distribution of studies by discipline, journal title and projected quality 
grading 
Discipline Journal Title
Number of 
papers
Projected 
Quality Grading
Accounting and Business Research 1 2*
Accounting Review 1 4*
Contemporary Accounting Research 1 3*
European Financial Management 1 2*
Financial Analysts Journal 5 3*
Journal of Accounting & Economics 1 4*
Journal of Accounting and Public Policy 1 3*
Journal of Accounting Literature 1 3*
Journal of Accounting Research 3 4*
Journal of Accounting, Auditing & Finance 1 3*
Journal of Business, Finance & Accounting 4 2*
Journal of Finance 4 4*
Journal of Financial Economics 2 4*
Journal of Financial Research 2 2*
Journal of Multinational Financial Management 1 2*
Managerial Finance 1 1*
Review of Financial Studies 2 4*
TOTAL 32 -
International Journal of Forecasting 1 3*
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 1 2*
Review of Financial Economics 1 1*
The American Economic Review 1 4*
TOTAL 4 -
Corporate Social Responsability Journal of Business Ethics 1 2*
Experimental Economics 1 N/A
The Financial Review 1 N/A
TOTAL 2 -
N/A Cranfield Woorking Paper 1 N/A
Finance & Accounting
Economics & Decision Science
N/A
 
Additionally, the vast majority of the selected papers have a clear positivistic approach and 
some of them, despite being classified in the accounting and finance discipline, are clearly 
associated with the psychology discipline. Moreover, 90 percent of the analysed papers can 
be classified as empirical (see figure 4.2.), despite the fact that most of them have a strong 
                                                 
31 The Journal Recommendations for Academic Publications define 4* as “Top international quality”, 3* as “Lower 
international quality”, 2* as “Top national quality” and 1* as “Lower national quality”. 
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theoretical justification for the empirical analyses. Finally, figure 4.3. shows that most 
empirical studies are located in the US (80.6 percent), followed by UK (13.9 percent). 
Empirical studies located in other countries are residual. 
Figure 4.2.: Percentage of empirical and 
non-empirical studies 
Figure 4.3.: Percentage of empirical 
studies by location 
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4.2. Report of the findings 
Considering that my research connects two areas of the literature that have hitherto been 
developed separately, I decided to divide the selected papers accordingly into two 
categories: analyst behaviour and going-concern literatures. 
4.2.1. Analyst behaviour 
In this section, I review the selected papers related to analyst behaviour. Since the search 
strings that I used to select them were somehow connected with analysts’ behaviour in a 
specific context (rationality and bias), the papers reflect that choice. On the other hand, 
the papers also reflect the preference for analysing analyst behaviour in the specific 
context of distressed firms. The sections below are presented thematically . 
4.2.1.1. Analysts’ forecast errors 
Prior to the discussion of analyst rationality, it is important to understand what is expected 
from rational behaviour. Ackert and Hunter (1995) define the main characteristics for 
rational expectations in two separate categories. First, the forecast errors, condit ional on 
the available information set, should have zero means (orthogonality property of rational 
expectations). Second, the forecast errors should be uncorrelated with the values of all the 
CRANFIELD SCHOOL OF MANAGEMENT  49 
variables in the information set, and therefore, with their own past values (lack of serial 
correlation property). Accordingly, Easterwood and Nutt (1999) present one of the simplest 
definitions of rationality in the analyst context: “a rational analysis of analyst behavior 
predicts that analysts immediately and without bias incorporate information into their 
forecasts”. 
Given the difficulties of defining what is meant by a rational market, Rubinstein (2001) 
proposes three market categorizations based on the degree of rationality: maximally 
rational markets, rational markets, and minimally rational markets. The first category of 
market rationality assumes that all investors are rational; the second assumes that asset 
prices are set as though all investors are rational, and the last assumes that even if 
markets are not rational, abnormal profit opportunities may not exist. This categorization is 
based on the view that investors’ rationality is “clearly an expository device not to be taken 
seriously” and thus, the debate should be regarding the degree of market rationality. 
Despite the clear relevance of analysts’ opinions to the market (see section 2.2.2.), much 
of the financial literature claims that analyst judgement is biased. In fact, several studies 
identify patterns in analysts’ behaviour inconsistent wit h analyst rationality (e.g., de Bondt 
and Thaler, 1990; Trueman, 1994; Easterwood and Nutt, 1999; Beckers et al., 2004). 
Interestingly, these papers use different terms when mentioning the same idea of analyst 
biased behaviour. The most frequent terms are forecast bias (Beckers et al., 2004), 
irrational forecasts (Easterwood and Nutt, 1999) and suboptimal forecasts (Easterwood and 
Nutt, 1999). The understanding of the reasons behind this type of biased behaviour and 
the specific situations that stimulate this behaviour are critical to analyse new events in 
which analysts’ biases can be tested. By connecting analyst behaviour and the going-
concern event, it is possible to contribute to the discussion of this phenomenon from a new 
point of view. 
One of the most important ideas extracted from the analysis of the selected papers is that 
the biased behaviour is usually connected (implicitly or explicitly) with analysts’ optimism. 
In fact, almost all of the analyst studies analysed identify patterns systematically consistent 
with optimism. The main reason justifying this optimistic analyst behaviour is related to the 
systematically  positive difference between forecasted and actual earnings per share (e.g., 
Brown, 1997; Easterwood and Nutt, 1999).32 According to Beckers et al. (2004), forecast 
                                                 
32 The systematically higher number of buy recommendations compared with the number of sell recommendations, 
particularly in the US, is another reason consistent with analysts’ optimism. In fact, one major difference between US 
and UK studies is the ratio of new buy to new sell recommendations. Considering US studies, the ratio is approximately 
7:1 (Womack, 1996) and between 4.1:1 and 5.2:1, depending on rating system used (Ho and Harris, 1998). Using UK 
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errors fall in two broad categories: optimism and herding. Therefore, the next sections 
analyse analysts’ optimism, particularly in the case of distressed firms and herding 
behaviour among analysts. 
4.2.1.1.1. Optimism in general situations 
Huberts and Fuller (1995) argue that if analysts are entirely rational forecasters, then on 
average, their estimates of EPS should not be unduly optimistic or pessimistic. However, 
their results contrast with this view since they find systematic analyst optimism. 
Additionally, analysts’ optimism is most pronounced for companies whose earnings have 
been hard to predict in the past. Considering this prediction bias, they find abnormal 
returns consistent with the forecast errors, even considering adjustments for industry 
factors, systematic risk, firm size and book-to-market. In fact, stocks of companies whose 
earnings have been previously hard to predict underperform the stocks of companies 
whose earnings have been relatively easy to predict. Huberts and Fuller’s (1995) results 
also show that analysts are not learning from past mistakes, since EPS forecasts appear to 
be biased in a consistently positive manner. An alternative explanation presented in this 
work is that analysts’ incentives do not facilitate the adjustment of their forecasts 
appropriately . 
Capstaff et al. (1995) present further evidence regarding analysts’ rationality. They 
examine the accuracy and rationality of earnings forecasts using a large sample of UK 
analysts. Their results raise considerab le doubt as to the rationality of earnings forecasts 
made by UK analysts. Through the use of econometric methods, they find evidence of 
optimism bias and overreaction in the forecasts. Additionally, analysts seem not take 
account of all available information when producing their forecasts, given that there was 
information available to analysts which has incremental explanatory power over that 
provided by the analysts’ forecasts. On the other hand, results point to the partial 
predictability of analysts’ forecast revisions since these forecasts are not independent of 
prior forecast changes in earnings. 
Despite the body of literature that suggests optimism in analysts forecasts, Brown (1997) 
argues that documented optimism has decreased over time. However, he does not 
question the optimism among security analysts. For instance, he finds that the mean 
surprise, which is one of the five definitions of error used in the analysis, is negative for all 
                                                                                                                                               
data, Ryan and Taffler (2004) calculate a ratio of 2.3:1, which suggests that UK analysts appear to be less optimistic 
than their US counterparts.  
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the years considered in the study, with just one exception. This means that, despite the 
fact that the results point to the reduction of forecast errors for the recent years of the 
sample, the optimism bias remains significant. Brown (1997) also states that the 
magnitude of analysts’ earnings forecast errors depends on the nature of the firms they are 
following. In fact, results reveal that analysts’ forecasting errors are smaller for firms listed 
in the S&P 500, for large market capitalization firms, for firms with higher absolute value of 
earnings forecast and with higher number of analysts following them. After dividing the 
sample firms by industry, Brown’s (1997) analysis demonstrates that there are some 
industries associated with larger forecasting errors. 
In another study addressing analysts’ optimism, Lim (2001) suggests that optimism in 
analysts’ forecasts should be higher for companies that have a more uncertain information 
environment, and for analysts who are more reliant on management access as a source of 
information. This assumption is justified by the issue of improving access to company 
management. His results show that analysts’ forecasts are more optimistic for smaller 
companies, and those that have a smaller analyst following, higher volatility, and past poor 
performances. 
Beckers et al. (2004) explore the influences on the accuracy of consensus earnings 
forecasts using a sample constituted by European stocks. The study is stimulated by the 
lack of evidence regarding the relation between optimism and herding behaviour among 
analysts and the simultaneous impact of firm characteristics, company sector and country 
affiliation. Beckers et al. (2004) find persistent and systematic differences in accuracy 
considering some of the above factors. In line with Brown (1997), they find that an 
increase in the number of analysts following a firm reduces forecast errors, and that the 
company’s sector has a significant effect on analysts’ accuracy. However, results do not 
support the relation between market capitalization and country effect with forecast 
accuracy. 
In a recent study, Ding et al. (2004) explo re analyst forecast behaviour under different 
scenarios. The authors present an interesting approach by relating analyst forecast 
behaviour to prospect theory with the analysis of how analysts react to positive and 
negative events, namely positive and negative earnings growth. The results show an 
asymmetric behaviour towards positive and negative earnings growth given that the higher 
earnings growth, the lower the forecast error. During times when the company’s EPS is 
growing, analysts are quite accurate in their forecast of EPS, which contrasts with the high  
overoptimism and overestimation of EPS when firms face a decline. This asymmetric 
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behaviour in terms of the positive and the negative earnings growth on forecast errors is 
similar to the value function of prospect theory, where gains and losses have an 
asymmetric impact on the value of a prospect. Another asymmetry on forecast errors 
extracted from the analysis relates to the impact of market sentiment. Ding et al. (2004) 
find that sentiment impacts forecast errors primarily during negative earnings growth, 
resulting in a significant positive impact on analysts’ forecast errors, but not during positive 
earnings growth. 
The six  studies above show that despite the general degree of optimism, optimism seems 
to be most pronounced in some specific cases. Therefore, it is particular important for my 
research to review studies that analyse analyst behaviour regarding distressed firms.33 This 
analysis verifies whether analysts continue to exhibit optimism in this particular case. The 
next section covers this question. 
4.2.1.1.2. Optimism regarding distressed firms 
Moses’ (1990) study presents evidence regarding how analysts’ earnings forecasts differ 
between different classes of firms, namely failing and healthy firms. Additionally, it 
examines whether those forecasts are useful indicators of impending bankruptcy. The 
results suggest that properties of analysts’ forecasts may differ considering failing and 
healthy firms, and may be a function of information disclosure practices of firms. In fact, 
analysts’ forecasts are of poor quality for firms approaching failure. Forecast errors and 
analysts’ overoptimism were greater for failing firms and increased as bankruptcy 
approached. However, despite this situation, Moses (1990) finds that analysts’ forecasts 
contain useful information for predicting future states of firms, specifically bankruptcy.  
In a more recent paper addressing analyst behaviour regarding distressed firms, Espahbodi 
et al. (2001) analyse analysts’ optimism regarding bankrupt and turnaround firms which 
experienced financial distress. The authors’ hypothesis is related to the possibility that 
analysts’ decisions to issue optimistic earnings forecasts is based on a comparison of the 
                                                 
33 Taking into account the fact that some characteristics mentioned in this section are present in most going-concern 
companies, it is important to analyse what the literature suggests regarding analyst behaviour in the specific case of 
distressed firms. In fact, although Beckers et al. (2004) do not support the results, Brown (1997) and Lim (2001) 
suggest that analysts’ forecast errors are higher in the case of small companies. On the other hand, Brown (1997) and 
Beckers et al. (2004) find that the higher number of analysts following a firm, the smaller the number of forecast errors. 
Considering that going-concern companies are generally small companies (Kausar et al., 2004) and that consequently it 
is expected that the number of analysts following them is not high, this analysis can be important. 
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costs and benefits of doing so.34 Espahbodi et al. (2001) argue that when the costs of 
issuing an optimistic forecast are higher than the benefits of doing so, optimism will be less 
apparent, or even absent. Espahbodi et al. (2001) test two hypotheses: 1) analysts are 
able to distinguish between bankrupt and turnaround firms; 2) optimism will be reduced 
when the cost of being optimistic exceeds the benefits. If the first hypothesis is correct, 
optimism in analysts’ forecasts for turnaround firms should persist, despite symptoms of 
financial distress. If the second hypothesis is valid, a decline in optimism is expected for 
both bankrupt and turnaround firms from the first signals of distress until recovery is 
established. Interestingly, the results indicate that some of the properties of analysts’ 
earnings forecasts for financially distressed firms are different from healthy firms 
considered in other works. Despite general analyst optimism shown for bankrupt and 
turnaround firms, forecast bias for bankrupt firms declines to insignificant levels one year 
before the bankruptcy filing. These findings are consistent with the theory that analysts’ 
forecast behaviour changes as they perceive the costs of issuing optimistic forecasts to be 
superior to the benefits of doing so. Considering the turnaround firms, results show that 
optimism declines by insignificant levels in the year of recovery and remains insignificant 
during the first half of the following year. Espahbodi et al. (2001) interpret these result s as 
analysts’ inability to distinguish between bankrupt and turnaround firms after two or more 
consecutive years of poor performance. Another signal of this inability is related to the 
analysts’ underreaction during the four years preceding bankruptcy, considering the cases 
of both bankrupt and turnaround firms. 
Another paper that examines the systematic differences between losing and profitable 
firms is Das (1998). This work analyses analyst forecast accuracy and bias by distinguishing 
between firms with positive and negative earnings realized. The objective of this distinction 
is to understand whether the properties of analysts’ forecasts documented in the literature 
extend to loss-making firms. Results show that, despite the general optimism for both 
cases, there are statistically significant differences in the bias and accuracy between loss 
and non-loss firms. In fact, analysts are more optimistic and less accurate considering the 
loss-making firms’ case rather than the profitable firms’ case. On the other hand, Das 
(1998) also finds that the magnitude of bias for both groups declines and the accuracy 
improves as the forecast horizon gets closer to the earnings announcement. These 
                                                 
34 According to Espahbodi et al. (2001), when analysts release optimistic earnings forecasts, they benefit from higher 
brokerage commissions and better management relations. By issuing optimistic forecasts, analysts’ costs are associated 
with their reputation and legal liability. 
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differences persist after controlling for differences due to forecast horizon, year of forecast 
and industry. 
Sedor (2002) offers an alternative explanation for analyst optimism in the context of loss-
making and profitable firms. She uses a full-factorial 2x2 between-subjects experiment, 
where the structure of information (scenario vs. list) and the sign of prior earnings (loss vs. 
profit) represent the independent variables, and participants’ forecasted earnings constitute 
the dependent variable to analyse the hypotheses. According to Sedor’s (2002) results, 
when managers use scenarios to frame information about their plans to increase future 
earnings, they are facilitating scenario thinking, which leads analysts to issue 
unintentionally optimistic forecasts. By doing that, managers are reducing analysts’ 
cognitive efforts to process the information, and consequently increasing the likelihood that 
the envisioned future performance improvement could occur. On the other hand, she also 
hypothesizes that analysts provided with management plans to increase future earnings 
make relatively more optimistic forecasts for a firm reporting losses than a firm reporting 
profits, since managers’ plans for loss-making firms are generally more informative. 
Additionally, scenario -induced optimism is greater for firms reporting prior losses than for 
firms reporting prior profits. 
4.2.1.1.3. Herding behaviour 
This section reviews four papers selected during the systematic search that cover analysts’ 
herding behaviour. It analyses one theoretical paper, two empirical papers documenting 
herding behaviour in the UK and US and finally, a paper which explores the motivations 
and implications of herding behaviour among security analysts. 
Trueman (1994) challenges the assumption that forecasts publicly released by analysts 
reflect their private information in an unbiased manner given analysts’ apparent herding 
behaviour. He develops a theoretical framework which suggests that under certain 
circumstances an analyst prefers to release a forecast that is close to prior expectations, 
even if issuing a more extreme forecast is justified by his private information. On the other 
hand, he states that the likelihood that the analyst releases a forecast similar to those 
previously announced by other analysts is greater than could be justified by his own 
information. 
De Bondt and Forbes (1999) present empirical evidence of herding behaviour among UK 
analysts. Besides results confirming a strong tendency to overoptimism and overreaction 
bias in consensus forecasts, they also find that UK analysts present evidence of herding 
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behaviour. Their  findings show that although the accuracy of the EPS forecasts deteriorates 
sharply as the time horizon lengthens, analyst consensus is unaffected and remains strong. 
When the authors divide their analysts’ forecasts by group, it is clear that the absolute 
errors increase with the forecast horizon but analyst disagreement remains almost 
unchanged. Additionally, de Bondt and Forbes (1999) state that the dispersion and range 
of forecasted earnings is alarmingly small. Other conclusions supporting the herding 
behaviour phenomenon is that, despite the tendency to an increase in the level of 
disagreement while coverage increases, this relation does not result in a significantly wider 
range of opinion about a company’s earnings beyond eight analysts. 
Using US data, Welch (2000) presents further evidence of herding behaviour among US 
security analysts. He analyses the influence of prevailing consensus and the most recent 
revisions by other analysts on current analysts’ choices by developing a new statistical 
methodology to measure that influence. The results suggest that the most recent two 
revisions have a positive influence on the next analyst revision. The strength of this 
influence is more pronounced when revisions are more recent and when they turn out to 
be more accurate predictors of security returns ex-post. On the other hand, results also 
suggest that the prevailing consensus has influence on analysts’ choices. A final idea 
extracted from this paper is that herding towards the consensus is significantly stronger 
when recent returns were positive and when the consensus is optimistic. 
Cote and Goodstein (1999) explore the motivations and implications of herding behaviour 
among security analysts. According to these authors, the motivation is related to the 
preservation of an analyst’s reputation, given the serious consequences when analysts 
issue contrary forecasts that are not correct. Herding behaviour implies the exacerbation of 
an existing directional forecast bias (optimistic or pessimistic) and the artificial constraint of 
boundaries among earnings forecasts. Consequently, Cote and Goodstein (1999) question 
the ethics associated with herding behaviour since the motivation of protecting one’s 
reputation should not justify the reduction of forecast accuracy. 
4.2.1.2. Analysing analysts’ forecast errors 
4.2.1.2.1. Do analysts under or overreact in their forecasts? 
Analyst under and overreaction has been the focus of much discussion in the last few 
years. However, there is no consensus regarding this issue, since several studies document 
analysts’ tendency to systematically underreact to information, and others suggest analysts’ 
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tendency to systematically overreact to information. Despite the conflicting results, recent 
research contributes to clarifying what is behind these situations and where analysts’ 
underreaction or overreaction can be expected. The search results find five papers that 
reflect this discussion and the advances made in recent years. 
De Bondt and Thaler (1990) present one of the first studies addressing overreaction in 
security analysts.35 They investigate the forecast changes in earnings per share produced 
by security analysts for one and two year time horizons. Specifically, they analyse whether 
forecast errors in EPS are systematically linked to forecasted changes and whether the bias 
in the forecasts gets stronger as uncertainty grows and less is known about the future. The 
first question provides an explanation for forecast changes being too extreme and the 
second question provides an explanation for the increase of optimism over the forecast 
horizon. Their results indicate that forecasts are too optimistic and are simply too extreme 
to be considered as rational, which is consistent with security analysts’ generalized 
overreaction. According to de Bondt and Thaler (1990), these results can be justified by 
behavioural explanations of anomalous financial market outcomes. However, they present 
two reasons to be cautious when justifying optimism bias with behavioural explanations. 
First, their econometric results present some exceptions to overreaction, and second, the 
agency interpretation can partially explain the optimism. Interestingly, the exceptions to 
overreaction and the economic incentives faced by analysts became two important topics in 
following research. 
In a subsequent study, Abarbanell and Bernard (1992) criticize de Bondt and Thaler’s 
(1990) conclusion that security analysts systematically overreact to earnings. Despite the 
fact that Abarbanell and Bernard’s (1992) findings suggest that analysts issue extreme 
forecasts of EPS changes, they do not support the explanation of overreaction to earnings 
information. The authors argue that there is one condition to conclude about overreaction 
that is not satisfied: extremely high forecasts should be related to firms recently 
experiencing strong earnings performance, and extremely low forecasts should be related 
to firms recently experiencing weak earnings forecasts. In fact, analysts’ forecasts were 
most in error in situations where they were optimistic despite poor recent earnings 
performance. Consequently, Abarbanell and Bernard (1992) argue that analysts seem to 
underreact to information about earnings although they possibly overreact to some other 
unspecified information. 
                                                 
35 The previous sections of the findings review two other articles that mention analysts’ overreaction: Capstaff et al. 
(1995) and de Bondt and Forbes (1999). 
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O’Han lon and Whiddett (1991) present further evidence of analysts’ underreaction. Using 
UK data, they compared two portfolios of companies attracting high and low revisions of 
earnings forecasts with the subsequent earnings forecasts of each group and the actual 
changes in annual earnings with forecast changes in annual earnings. In contrast with de 
Bondt and Thaler (1990), these authors suggest that analysts underreact. O’Hanlon and 
Whiddett (1991) conjecture that the differences between their UK study and US studies 
could be justified by different remuneration systems and possible international differences 
in investment regulation. 
Amir and Ganzach (1998)36 provide a new insight to this discussion by presenting an 
explanation for the under and overreaction among security analysts. Although de Bondt 
and Thaler (1990) and Abarbanell and Bernard’s (1992) results are inconsistent with each 
other, both are consistent with the non-rational forecast view. In order to clarify the 
inconsistencies in the literature, Amir and Ganzach (1998) distinguish between positive and 
negative forecast changes in order to examine a possible asymmetric behaviour. In fact, 
they confirm this possibility by finding a tendency to overreaction considering the positive 
forecast modification case (good news) and a tendency to underreact considering the 
negative forecast modifications case (bad news).37 A complementary analysis shows that 
for the negative forecast revision group, the tendency to underreact diminishes 
considerably as the earnings release month approaches. In contrast, for positive revision 
forecasts there is little change in overreaction over time. Amir and Ganzach (1998) justify 
these results using a behavioural decision theory explanation. They state that there are 
three heuristic s influencing earnings forecasts, and thus contributing to the explanation of 
their results: leniency, representativeness, and anchoring and adjustment. 
Easterwood and Nutt (1999) present additional evidence of different analyst reactions 
conditional on the nature of the information received. After discriminating between good 
and bad news and the type of reaction by analysts, these authors conclude that analysts 
systematically overreact only to new positive earnings information. Regarding new negative 
earnings information, Easterwood and Nutt (1999) claim the opposite reaction. The 
underreaction to bad news and overreaction to good news phenomenon is inconsistent 
with the perspective that analysts systematically overweight information. This asymmetric 
                                                 
36 Amir and Ganzach (1998) distinguish between two types of forecast modification. Forecast revisions are defined as 
the difference between the new earnings forecast and the previous forecast. Forecast changes are defined as the 
difference between the prediction of future earnings and the previously announced earnings figure. 
37 After dividing their sample into positive forecast revisions and negative forecast revisions, they show that for the first 
sub-sample most of the forecast errors are negative, but for the negative forecast revision group most of the forecast 
errors are positive. 
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behaviour shows that analysts are systematically optimistic concerning the implications of 
new information, rather than systematically misinterpreting all new information. 
4.2.1.2.2. Do economic incentives influence analysts’ forecasts? 
The paper selection finds four studies addressing the relation between the economic 
incentives faced by analysts and their forecasts. From the reading of the previous sections 
it is possible to conjecture that there are cognitive explanations behind analysts’ behaviour. 
However, as de Bondt and Thaler (1990) argue, there are many reasons to be sceptical 
that sophisticated agents are subject to the same biases as students in laboratory 
experiments. In fact, these authors suggest that the agency interpretation can partially 
justify analysts’ optimism as a complementary explanation to cognitive reasons. 
Dugar and Nathan (1995) analyse the incentives enjoyed by  analysts working for 
brokerage firms that provide investment banking services to the follow firms (investment 
banker analysts) when forming their opinions. The results show that earnings forecasts and 
investment recommendations provided by such analysts are more optimistic relative to 
other analysts who are not in that situation (non- investment banker analysts). 
Additionally, the results suggest that capital market participants seem to recognize 
investment banker analysts’ higher level of optimism. In contrast with investment banker 
analysts, non-investment banker analyst reports are associated with a significant market 
reaction around the release date. 
Michaely and Womack (1999) also present evidence consistent with particular optimism 
regarding analysts who work for brokerage houses with investment banking relations 
among the firms they are following. This study suggests that underwriter analysts’ 
recommendations of Initial Public Offerings (IPO) firms have significantly worse 
performance than non-underwriter analysts. Results demonstrate that the difference 
between these groups is more than 50 percent considering a two-year holding period 
starting from the IPO day. The authors also suggest that there is conflict of interest 
between analysts’ fiduciary responsibility to investing clients and their incentive to market 
stocks underwritten by their firms. With the objective of evaluating the impact of cognitive 
explanations in the results, Michaely and Womack (1999) survey investment bankers and 
investment managers involved in the IPO process. Their findings show that results can be 
explained by conflict of interest rather than cognitive explanations. 
In a more recent paper, Hodgkinson (2001) addresses the relation between the accuracy 
and efficiency of analysts’ forecasts and the type of relationship that the analyst has with a 
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firm. Despite the confirmation that analysts provide optim istic forecasts for broker firms, 
results suggest that the close working relationship may not mean superior information. In 
fact, results show that analysts’ forecasts are not more accurate for broker firms. The 
author argues that this may be explained by analysts’ choice not to pass that privileged 
information to investors. In an attempt to understand the effect of firm size on analyst 
forecasts, Hodgkinson (2001) does not find a more pronounced bias for small firms, 
although there is evidence that analyst forecasts are less accurate for these firms. 
Hong and Kubik (2003) present further evidence regarding economic incentives faced by 
analysts. They examine analysts’ career concerns by relating their earnings forecasts to job 
moves. Their findings suggest that analyst careers are dependent on their accuracy, but 
this is not the only reason for being rewarded. The authors find that extremely inaccurate 
analysts are about 62 percent more likely to experience a move down the hierarchy, and 
extremely accurate analysts are about 52 percent more likely to experience a move up. 
However, brokerage houses also compensate optimistic analysts since these analysts are 
more likely to experience favourable job changes. Optimistic analysts are 38 percent less 
likely to move down the hierarchy and 90 percent more likely to move up the hierarchy. 
This reward for optimism is more acute when analysts are covering stocks underwritten by 
their brokerage houses. Considering this case, job moves depend less on accuracy and 
more on optimism. Nevertheless, this conflict should not be reduced solely to the 
underwriting relationship cases, since results suggest that analysts are rewarded for 
promoting stocks even when they do not have this relationship. 
4.2.1.2.3. Cognitive or economic-based explanation? 
The studies analysed previously give some insight into the reasons underlying the analysts’ 
optimism.  Some of them justify analysts’ optimism with cognitive explanations and others 
with economic incentives. However, the precise weight that each explanation has in the 
understanding of analysts’ optimism still unclear. In fact, given the difficulty of separating 
these influences, research does not present a clear answer to this question. The following 
paragraphs review three papers that cover this discussion. 
Löffler (1998) addresses the question of earnings forecasts’ rationality by discriminating 
among several competing explanations for biases using a large sample of individual analyst 
earnings forecasts of German companies. The basic assumption behind his analysis is that 
analysts deviate from the rational prediction when this has favourable effects on the 
assessment of their forecasting ability. The study’s results support this view since analysts 
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tend to issue biased forecasts when they believe that they can be useful for communicating 
information about forecast precision. In order to do that, analysts distort their estimates in 
a way which gives them a more appropriate weight in the clients’ decision process.  
Tamura (2002) focuses on individual analysts’ forecast errors by analysing their  relation to 
the number of analysts covering the company, volatility of the stock, amount of past 
forecast error, broker’s reputation and average “distance” between the analyst’s forecast 
and the consensus forecast. Although results indicate a significant positive serial correlation 
between forecast errors and both ordinary consensus and individual-analyst averages, they 
also demonstrate that some analysts’ characteristics are correlated with forecast errors. 
Tamura (2002) suggests that analysts dealing with bad news and analysts who herd to 
consensus forecasts tend to underreact in the presence of new information compared with 
other analysts. Moreover, results point out that analysts are affected by their personalities 
in forecasting, particularly when they are dealing with bad news. In fact, by analysing the 
optimistic and pessimistic analysts separately, the author concludes that a relatively 
optimistic analyst tends to continue to be optimistic , while a pessimistic analyst tends to 
continue to be pessimistic. 
In an attempt to clarify the potential influence of cognitive factors in explaining analyst 
optimism, Stevens and Williams (2004) construct a scenario where environmental factors 
and incentives unique to analysts are absent and human decision bias is more evident. 
Their choice for experimental research is justified by the possibility offered by this method 
to differentiate between forecast misreaction caused by incentives unique to analysts and 
misreaction caused by human decision bias. Stevens and Williams (2004) use 
undergraduate students in accounting and economic s classes to test whether these 
subjects present the same systematic optimism regarding positive and negative information 
showed by analy sts. Stevens and Williams’ (2004) results show that subjects’ forecasts 
systematically underreact to both positive and negative informational signals and tend to 
underreact more to positive signals than to negative signals. These results suggest that 
prior archival evidence of forecast overreaction to positive information is unlikely to be 
attributable to human decision bias. 
4.2.1.2.4. Analysts’ preference to withhold unfavourable forecasts 
McNichols et al. (1997) investigate analysts’ optimism from a different perspective. Instead 
of focusing on the incentives that analysts have to issue optimistic forecasts, these authors 
examine their disincentives to disclose negative information. Specifically, McNichols et al.  
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(1997) explore whether analysts are more likely to report on stocks about which they have 
favourable views. The results suggest analysts’ preference to withhold unfavourable 
forecasts, since analysts tend to start covering firms they view favourably and stop 
covering firms they view unfavourably. In fact, McNichols et al. (1997) show that stocks 
recently added into analysts’ lists of followed stocks are heavily weighted toward “Strong 
Buy” recommendations compared with other stocks with previous recommendations. In 
contrast, stocks dropped by  analysts tend to have lower ratings than those whose coverage 
continues. McNichols et al. (1997) reinforce the fact that their results should be interpreted 
as partial explanation for analysts’ optimism by refuting the idea that analysts introduce 
less forecast bias near the end of coverage. The authors support this view, arguing that 
analysts do not report forecasts when they drop stocks from coverage. Consequently, 
analysts do not reflect negative information in their final sample of observed forecasts and 
thus the final sample of observed forecasts will be, on average, too high given the selection 
conditional to their expectations. 
4.2.1.2.5. Do forecast errors imply analysts’ non-rational behaviour? 
Despite the fact that most studies argue that the forecast errors should be considered as 
evidence for analysts’ non-rational behaviour, there are some exceptions. Ackert and 
Hunter (1994) hypothesise that despite the rejection of the simple form of the rational 
expectation hypothesis, analysts’ forecasts may be converging toward rational expectations 
forecasts from a dynamic perspective. They present two possible explanations to justify 
this possible dynamic form of rationality. First, forecasts can become more rational with the 
accumulation of additional relevant information. This information includes future corporate 
earnings, and the determinants of these earnings or estimates of other analysts. Second, 
rationality of analysts’ forecasts may simply depend on the amount of time between the 
forecasts and the date on which actual earnings are announced. After concluding that 
analysts’ forecasts do not conform to the simple rational expectations notion of an optimal 
forecast, Ackert and Hunter (1994) analyse the econometric outputs from a dynamic 
perspective. Their results show a dynamic behaviour of the estimated constant and slope 
coefficients, which is consistent with their initial hypothesis. The rejection of the simple 
rational expectations hypothesis in favour of dynamic rationality leads Ackert and Hunter 
(1994) to interpret these results as a consequence of heterogeneity in security analyst 
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information processing abilities.38 They also argue that their results are consistent with the 
presence of herding behaviour among security analysts as later papers show (e.g., 
Trueman, 1994; de Bondt and Forbes, 1999; Welch, 2000). 
In a subsequent study, Ackert and Hunter (1995) argue that the use of less general 
statistical tests, which establish necessary but not sufficient conditions for rationality, has 
undoubtedly been a contributing factor to explain the lack of consensus regarding analysts’ 
rationality.39 Ackert and Hunter (1995) define two methodological problems in most of the 
studies addressing analysts’ rationality. First, most of these studies only consider the lack 
of serial correlation property to reach a conclusion about analysts’ rationality, which 
although it is necessary, is not sufficient to draw conclusions about rationality. Another 
methodological issue criticised by Ackert and Hunter (1995) is that the few studies dealing 
with orthogonality do not address the aggregation problems associated with the samples. 
In fact, by using published expectation series based on aggregated or averaged values, 
these may not constitute perfect measures of the true underlying expectations of the 
individual agents. This situation can lead researchers to reject (fail to reject) rationality 
when the individual agents are in fact rational (not rational). The results of their 
econometric tests reject analyst forecast rationality, but results are sensitive to the data 
used. Therefore, Ackert and Hunter (1995) do not support the rational expectation 
hypothesis, but exceptions can be found depending on the analysts’ forecasts chosen, the 
time period covered or the observation interval. 
Lim (2001) presents an alternative view justifying the empirical evidence rejecting the 
classical standards of the analysts’ rational expectation hypothesis. The argument is simple: 
considering that analysts’ livelihoods depend on the accuracy of their forecasts, it seems 
reasonable to look at these forecasts as if they were analysts’ best expectations. Therefore, 
he argues that optimistic forecasts can be rational if they act to decrease forecast errors. 
By issuing optimistic forecasts for a given firm, analysts can improve their access to 
company management and thus benefit from this key source of non-public company 
                                                 
38 Their interpretation is based on Haltiwanger and Waldman’s (1985) model, which assumes that there are congestion 
and synergy effects associated with the forecasts of agents and that sophisticated agents can anticipate naïve agents’ 
behaviour. Congestion effect refers to a situation where for any agent i, the higher the number of other agents who 
make the same forecast as agent i, the less well off is agent i (in terms of utility or monetary compensation). 
Synergistic effect refers to a situation opposite to that of congestion effect. Considering this effect, for agent i, the 
higher the number of other agents who make the same forecast as agent i, the better off is agent i. Ackert and Hunter 
(1994) argue that the rejection of the simple rational expectations hypothesis is consistent with the notion that 
synergistic effects dominate congestion effects among analysts, meaning that naïve or non-rational analysts have a 
disproportionately large effect on equilibrium forecasts.  
39 As mentioned in section 4.2.1.1., orthogonality and lack of serial correlation properties are necessary to draw 
conclusions about rational expectations.  
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information. By issuing unfavourable forecasts, analysts may reduce or eliminate their 
access to this source of information, given that managers may create difficulties for these 
analysts in responsing to those forecasts. Based on these assumptions, Lim (2001) 
proposes and tests a quadratic -loss utility function for modelling earnings forecasts, where 
analysts trade off bias to improve management access and forecast accuracy. Results show 
that forecast bias varies predictably across companies and analysts consistently with the 
author’s assumptions. These results suggest that optimism may be a rational property of 
optimal earnings forecasts. 
4.2.1.3. Informational content of analysts’ reports 
There is strong evidence that markets consider analysts’ opinions important. Several papers 
demonstrate that analysts’ earnings forecasts and recommendations have influence in 
stock prices. However, the informational content of the accompanying analysts’ reports in 
addition to their most visible outputs is not so clear. This section reviews two papers 
addressing this question. 
Ho and Harris (2000) examine the full text of the accompanying analysts’ reports in order 
to evaluate what information is provided by analysts to justify the changes in 
recommendations/earnings forecasts, and whether the rationale used is different 
considering the upgrade and downgrade investment advice. Addit ionally, they analyse the 
market reaction considering the different rationales provided to investors: information 
based on the underlying company (e.g., revisions in earnings forecasts) and publicly 
available information on changes in share prices. Their conclusions reveal that analysts 
reports associated with most analysts’ recommendations provide fundamental information 
to markets. First, most recommendation changes (approximately 70 percent) mention 
analysts’ earnings revisions or an assessment of business factors. Second, despite the 
general market reaction to recommendation changes, Ho and Harris (2000) find that the 
market reacts more strongly  to explicit fundamental information. In fact, the largest price 
reaction is related to recommendations supported by an analyst’s revised earnings forecast. 
This suggests that markets seem to pay attention to the words behind analysts’ investment 
advice. On the other hand, analysts seem to be more careful when issuing downgrades 
since they only do that when they are sufficiently confident to support the change with a 
quantitative analysis, namely an earnings forecast revision. In contrast, a general business 
factor seems to be sufficient for an upgrade. 
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In a recent study, Asquith et al. (2005) present further evidence that the market does not 
ignore security analysts’ reports. Since most papers only analyse stock recommendations 
and earnings forecasts, these authors add the entire content of analysts’ reports in the 
analysis of the information provided by analysts. Their results support the idea that the 
content of analysts’ reports has information value. In fact, stronger arguments supporting 
analysts’ opinions lead to stronger market reaction. Additionally, the market impact of 
earnings revisions and recommendation downgrades are significantly greater for small 
firms and for firms with a smaller analyst following. On the other hand, the market treats 
an analyst report differently according to whether it is an old recommendation, an upgrade 
or a downgrade. In fact, Asquith et al. (2005) show that the contents of analysts’ reports 
receive the most scrutiny in the case of downgrades. 
4.2.2. Going-concern opinions 
4.2.2.1. Do going-concern opinions have informational value? 
Asare (1990) presents a review of several studies addressing the informational value of 
audit qualifications in general and going-concern opinions in particular. The literature 
review of this topic finds that there is no consensus regarding the utility of the going-
concern report. Asare (1990) highlights the conflicting results of these market-based 
studies and presents some possible explanations for the contradictions: i) studies are not 
consistent in their use of qualification announcement dates; ii) studies are not consistent in 
the use of windows for testing the information content hypotheses; iii) inability to 
unequivocally control for other concurrent information accompanying the financial 
statements; and iv) some studies use “subject to” opinions in general and are not designed 
to specifically address the going-concern report. Additionally, Asare (1990) suggests that 
researchers may increase the power of their statistical tests of stock price effects if they 
distinguish between “predictable” opinions and “surprises”. 
Ameen et al.  (1994) argue that the failure of some studies to find information content for 
audit qualification (Elliott, 1982; Dodd et al., 1984) may be related to the amount of 
information available for those firms. In fact, most of the studies that find no informational 
content in audit qualifications use very large firms and firms which are traded on national 
stock exchanges. Therefore, Ameen et al. (1994) hypothesise that the more information 
available to investors, the less salient any particular source becomes for users of this 
information. Considering this hypothesis, large firms are less influenced by audit 
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qualifications than smaller firms. The authors design a study to test the informational 
content of audit reports for small firms and conclude that the market reacts negatively 
before the first observable public announcement. In fact, the only sub-period with 
significant negative abnormal returns is before the announcement, which means that when 
the qualification is announced, the reaction is mitigated by previous market reaction in 
response to the expectations. However, given that this study analyses audit qualifications 
in general, it may be possible that some of them may provide information less severe than 
expected (good news), while others may provide information more severe then expected 
(bad news). For this reason, the audit qualifications in general do not constitute a clear 
case of bad news, and an unambiguous case of bad news should be used to understand 
this phenomenon. 
4.2.2.2. Different market reaction to going-concern opinions 
The final sample of papers contains two studies that directly address the information 
content of going-concern opinions to the markets. The methodology develop by Taffler et 
al. (2004) and Kausar et al. (2004) to examine this question allows a clarification of this 
issue by avoiding the methodological problems suggested by Asare (1990). These two 
studies suggest that the going-concern report itself has market value. Using UK and US 
data respectively, Taffler et al. (2004) and Kausar et al. (2004) present clear evidence that 
the market underreacts to bad news. Kausar et al. (2004) also find that good news 
(namely the case of GCM withdrawal) is fully anticipated by the market. 
Taffler et al. (2004) contribute to the literature by suggesting that the market takes time to 
assimilate bad news. Using the unambiguous bad news event of a first time going-concern 
audit modification report by a firm, they find that the UK market underreacts after the 
release of these reports. In fact, results show that in the 12 months after the information 
disclosure, firms underperform by between 24 percent and 31 percent, depending on the 
benchmark adopted. After test ing for alternative explanations, the authors conclude that 
the underreaction cannot be explained by poor firm matching or bad model problems.40 
This possibility is refuted by matching the sample firms on a one-to-one basis with firms 
that present the same earnings collapse but with no audit GCM. The results show that the 
market underreaction is not a post-earnings announcement drift phenomenon. 
                                                 
40 In fact, since most GCM-issue firms in the sample also experience earnings collapses during the same period, and 
considering the literature that suggests that extreme negative earnings changes are followed by abnormally low returns 
(e.g., Ball and Brown, 1968; Bernard and Thomas, 1989), one could argue that GCM issuances are merely a proxy for 
earnings surprises. 
CRANFIELD SCHOOL OF MANAGEMENT  66 
Kausar et al. (2004) extend Taffler et al. (2004) by analysing the market reactions to good 
and bad news in the going-concern opinion context.41 This study analyses the twelve-
month pre- and post-event monthly returns following the publication of the GCM audit 
report and its withdrawal for 845 firms from 1994 to 2002. Considering the mean buy -and-
hold returns in the twelve months prior to the GCM and subsequent GCM withdrawal, firm 
stock prices decline by -50 percent and rise by 102 percent respectively. Moreover, after 
the GCM and GCM withdrawal public announcement, the two samples exhibit  different 
patterns. Considering the twelve month period after the event announcement, the first-
time GCM sample underperforms by -16 percent, whereas the GCM withdrawal firms 
exhibit  no significant market reaction. These results indicate that market fully anticipates 
good news (GCM withdrawal) while it  underreacts to bad news (GCM opinion). 
The different market reaction in the GCM context constitutes additional evidence that the 
traditional finance paradigm has some deficiencies in explaining the market behaviour. The 
authors offer two different psychological theories drawn from behavioural explanations in 
order to theoretically justify the results. First, mental accounting and investor inability to 
realize losses (Shefrin and Statman, 1985) based on Kahneman and Tversky’s (1979) 
prospect theory presents a consistent explanation to explain the results of Taffler et al. 
(2004) and Kausar et al. (2004). Second, Kausar et al.’s (2004) results are aligned with 
Taffler et al.’s (2004) explanation that the market denies GCM releases. Additionally, these 
two studies suggest that the opportunity to earn profits by trading on this anomaly is 
limited and highly risky. In fact, results show that the trading costs (bid-ask spread, stock 
borrowing costs and trading commissions) associated with a possible arbitrage strategy are 
likely to eliminate any potential profits that might apparently be earned. These results are 
consistent with the minimally rational paradigm (Rubinstein, 2001). 
4.2.2.3. Expectations of a GCM 
Finance research suggests that markets anticipate some events. Asare (1990) suggests 
that, in the case of going-concern opinions, it is important to researchers to distinguish 
between “predictable” opinions and “surprises” in order to increase the power of the 
statistical tests. This section reviews four papers that cover whether or not going-concern 
opinion decisions can be predicted using publicly available information. 
                                                 
41 This study presents a new approach to the GCM literature since it analyses not only the market reaction to first-time 
GCM opinion (bad news), but also the market reaction to the subset of firms that one year later received the withdrawal 
of such opinions (good news).  
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For instance, Mutchler (1985) applies a discriminant analysis approach using the top six 
ratios ranked by auditors as useful in identifying a company with a potential going-concern 
problem to discriminate between companies receiving this auditor opinion decis ion and 
others that do not.42 She uses 119 companies that receive a going-concern opinion and 
119 companies with going-concern difficulties that do not receive going-concern opinion. 
Her results suggest that her financial ratio-based model is able to predict a going-concern 
opinion with a relatively high level of accuracy using only publicly available financial 
information. 
Further research suggests that negative stock price adjustments are dependent on the 
expectation of forthcoming going-concern opinions.43 Loudder et al. (1992) mention that 
previous findings of no market reaction to audit qualifications may be explained by the 
failure to control for market expectations. Their results show that the disclosure of an 
unexpected opinion and the non-disclosure of an expected opinion have market impact. In 
particular, their study emphasizes that “unexpected” audit opinion firms are more likely to 
exhibit negative abnormal returns around the qualification disclosure date than the 
“expected” firms, because the market has already anticipated and impounded this  
information. These findings reinforce the benefits of incorporating expectations into an 
event model when there are different prior probabilities of the sample firms experiencing 
the event under examination (Loudder et al., 1992). 
Jones (1996) analyses firms’ abnormal returns surrounding the release of the auditor’s 
report for going-concern uncertainties (bad news) and unqualified reports for distressed 
firms (good news).44 Broadly speaking, he finds negative abnormal returns surrounding the 
release of the auditor’s report for firms receiving going-concern opinions and positive 
abnormal returns considering the case of good news. Jones (1996) also uses a logistic 
regression containing publicly available data to estimate the likelihood of a firm receiving a 
going-concern opinion in order to measure the market expectation.45 In fact, the 
magnitude of the abnormal returns depends on the extent to which the opinion type was 
                                                 
42 Ratio choice is based on Mutchler (1984).  
43 See Loudder et al. (1992) and Fleak and Wilson (1994). 
44 Distressed companies were defined as those with negative income from operations and either: 1) negative retained 
earnings or 2) negative working capital.  
45 The going-concern prediction can be made using different statistical methods. Koh and Low (2004) compare the 
performance of different techniques like neural networks, decision trees and logistic regression for this task. All these 
techniques are considered as data mining, but only logistic regression can be considered a traditional statistical method. 
The results suggests that all three techniques give adequate results, but highlight that neural networks and decision 
trees can supplement and complete traditional statistic methods. Indeed, Trigueiros and Taffler (1996) have concluded 
that neural network approaches could make a potential contribution in accounting research. 
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unexpected. Jones’ (1996) results suggest that researchers should recognize the 
importance of going-concern expectations and should be aware of the influence of default 
or debt restructuring surprise when analysing market reaction to disclosures by distressed 
firms. 
Blay and Geiger (2001) examine whether firms’ subsequent viability status is related to the 
magnitude of abnormal returns surrounding the announcement of a going-concern audit 
report. Before using a proxy for market expectations, they do not find abnormal returns 
significantly different from zero considering their entire sample. However, when their 
sample is divided into two, depending on the firms’ subsequent outcome, abnormal returns 
are significantly lower for the viable group compared with the subsequently bankrupt 
group. This seems to indicate an association between the bankruptcy partition with market 
expectations and share price adjustments for the sample of first-time going-concern report 
recipients. The authors defend their results on the basis that this naïve partition is an 
incremental measure of market expectations for a going-concern audit report. 
4.3. Discussion 
This section has two objectives. The first is to review the main conclusions extracted from 
the synthesis of the selected papers in an integrated form. The second is to present the 
basis for the suggestions for further research. 
4.3.1. Optimism 
The systematic review of the literature shows that the strongest idea presented in the 
papers addressing analyst behaviour is that these market agents are optimistic. In fact, the 
papers analysed suggest that analysts tend to be optimistic in their analyses, and that 
optimism is most pronounced in some specific situations. Table 4.5. reviews the main 
findings regarding analysts’ optimism from the selected papers. In fact, the papers 
analysed are unanimous in considering analysts’ forecasts as optimistic (directly or 
indirectly). That tendency is verified in different markets and different periods of time. 
Research on analysts’ forecasts in the UK, US and Europe, considering samples from 1976 
to date, points to a significant excess of optimism. This tendency is justified by the 
systematic positive difference between forecasts and actual EPS, and the systematic higher 
number of buy recommendations compared with the number of sell recommendations. 
However, the review of the selected papers shows that there are scenarios where analysts’ 
optimism seems to be more prominent. 
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Table 4.5.: Summary of empirical evidence on analysts’ optimism 
Study Data
Sample 
location Main findings regarding analysts' optimism
De Bondt and Thaler (1990)
Forecast changes in EPS for 
one and two-year time 
horizons (1976-1984)
US Forecasts are too optimistic.
Moses (1990)
Annual EPS forecasts for 136 
firms declaring bankruptcy 
US
Evidence of general optimism. Analysts' optimism seems to be more 
pronounced for failing firms and increases as bankruptcy approached.
Abarbanell and Bernard (1992) EPS forecasts for 178 firms 
(1976-1986)
US Analysts' optimism despite poor recent earnings performance.
Capstaff et al. (1995)
56,090 forecasts of EPS for 
1,315 firms (1987-1990)
UK Results suggest optimistic bias among analysts.
Huberts and Fuller (1995)
Mean estimates of analysts' 
EPS for all the largest 1,500 
firms (1977-1990)
US
Results suggest analysts' systematic optimistic. Current forecasts of 
earnings are excessively optimistic for companies whose earnings were 
hard to predict in the past.
Brown (1997)
Analysts' quarterly earnings 
forecasts (1983-1996) US
Significant analysts' optimism bias although its decrease over time. The 
magnitude of analysts' earnings forecast errors seems to be less acute for 
firms not listed in the S&P 500, firms with small market capitalization, 
firms with smaller number of analysts following and firms with lower 
absolute value of earnings forecasts.
Das (1998) Mean monthly analysts' 
forecasts (1985-1993)
US
General optimism considering the all sample. Analysts are more optimistic 
and less accurate for loss firms than profitable firms. Optimism declines 
as the forecast horizon gets closer to the earnings announcement.
Amir and Ganzach (1998)
Monthly consensus forecasts 
of annual EPS (1976-1990) US
Analysts' optimism that weakens as the release of the actual earnings 
approaches
Easterwood and Nutt (1999) 10.694 consensus forecasts of 
annual EPS
US Analysts' forecasts are systematically optimistic.
De Bondt and Forbes (1999)
441,000 forecasts of EPS for 
1,731 firms (1986-1997) UK Strong evidence of excessive optimism.
Lim (2001)
Analysts' quarterly earnings 
forecasts for 300 brokerage 
firms (1984-1996)
US
Evidence of analysts' optimism. Analysts’ optimism seems to be more 
pronounced for smaller firms, firms with smaller number of analyst 
following, firms with higher volatility and firms with past poor 
performance.
Espahbodi et al. (2001)
Analysts forecasts for 350 
bankrupt firms (1985-1993) 
and 631 turnaround firms 
(1983-1991)
US
General optimism for both bankrupt and turnaround firms. Analysts' 
inability to distinguish between these two groups of firms after two or 
more consecutive years of poor performance.
Sedor (2002) Analysis of case material by 
86 sell-side analysts
US
Forecast optimism is an unintentional consequence of analysts' reactions 
to the structure of information about managers' future plans. Scenario-
induced optimism is greater for firms reporting losses.
Beckers et al. (2004)
Earnings forecasts for 
selected companies (1993-
2002)
Europe
Evidence consistent with optimism in analysts consensus earnings 
forecasts. The increase in the number of analysts following a firm reduces 
forecast errors.
Ding et al. (2004) Quarterly EPS forecasts for 
2,084 firms (1987-2000)
US Analysts' optimism during periods of negative earnings growth.
 
The studies addressing analysts’ optimism reveal that tendency towards optimism is 
particularly manifested in situations of financial distress. In fact, optimism seems to be 
more evident for failing firms (Moses, 1990), loss-making firms (Das, 1998), firms with past 
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poor performance (Lim, 2001) and during periods of negative earnings growth (Ding et al., 
2004). Even considering samples of bankrupt firms, analysts maintain this tendency 
(Moses, 1990 and Espahbodi et al., 2001). 
The review of these papers also suggests that the magnitude of errors in analysts’ 
forecasts depends on the number of analysts following. Studies like Brown (1997), Lim 
(2001) and Beckers et al., (2004) find that analysts’ optimism seems to be more evident 
when firms have a smaller number of analysts following them. On the other hand, the 
studies’ results propose that firm size can explain the degree of optimism in analysts’ 
forecasts. Although Beckers et al. (2004) do not corroborate this idea for their European 
sample, Brown (1997) and Lim (2001) find higher levels of optimism for small firms and 
firms not in the S&P 500. This relation seems to be consistent with the excessive optimism 
for firms whose earnings were hard to predict in the past (Huberts and Fuller, 1995), firms 
with lower absolute values of earnings forecasts (Brown, 1997) and firms with higher 
volatility (Lim, 2001). Additionally, the company’s sector seems to influence the level of 
analysts’ optimism given their significant effect on analysts’ accuracy (Brown, 1997; 
Beckers et al, 2004). Finally, other consistent findings among the papers analysed is the 
decline of optimism as the forecast horizon gets closer to the earnings announcement 
(Amir and Ganzach, 1998; Das, 1998). 
4.3.2. Cognitive-bias explanation 
Some of the above results are consistent with several asymmetries in analyst behaviour. 
For instance, studies like Amir and Ganzach (1998) and Easterwood and Nutt (1999) find 
that analysts exhibit an asymmetric behaviour in the presence of good and bad news. This 
situation is explained by Amir and Ganzach (1998) by the behavioural decision theory, 
which is one of the main explanations for the analysts’ biased behaviour. Table 4.6. 
reviews the main findings of the eight studies included in the systematic review addressing 
the under and overreaction to earnings forecasts. 
De Bondt and Thaler (1990) and O’Hanlon and Whiddett (1991) present conflicting results 
regarding the under and overreaction in analysts’ forecasts, which were explained by 
O’Hanlon and Whiddett (1991) as due to the possible effects of different remuneration 
systems and different investment regulation between the US and UK. However, Capstaff et 
al. (1995) and de Bondt and Forbes (1999) find overreaction in UK analysts, which 
contradicts O’Hanlon and Whiddett’s (1991) explanation. Abarbanell and Bernard’s (1992) 
results are in line with O’Hanlon and Whiddett (1991), given that they find evidence 
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consistent with analysts’ forecast underreaction. Although Abarbanell and Bernard (1992)  
support the argument of analysts’ forecasts being too extreme, they reject the overreaction 
phenomenon since their results fail to relate extremely high forecasts with firms recently 
experiencing strong earnings performance, or extremely low forecasts with firms 
experiencing weak earnings forecasts. Amir and Ganzach (1998) and Easterwood and Nutt 
(1999) divide analysts’ forecasts conditional to the nature of the information preceding the 
forecast: good news and bad news. Broadly speaking, these two studies find that analysts 
underreact in the presence of good news and overreact in the presence of bad news, 
consistent with systematic optimism. This explanation seems to clarify the conflicting 
results in the previous literature and is consistent with behavioural theories justifying 
asymmetric behaviours. Finally, Espahbodi et al. (2001) present evidence supporting this 
different reaction given the analysts’ underreaction to the bankruptcy. 
Table 4.6.: Summary of empirical evidence on under and overreaction in analysts’ 
forecasts 
Study Data
Sample 
location
Main findings regarding analysts' under and 
overreaction
De Bondt and Thaler 
(1990)
Forecast changes in EPS for one 
and two-year time horizons (1976-
1984)
US Overreaction in analysts' forecast.
O´Hanlon and Whiddet 
(1991)
Revisions of the consensus EPS 
forecasts (1987-1990)
UK Underreaction in analysts' forecasts.
Abarbanell and Bernard 
(1992)
EPS forecasts for 178 firms (1976-
1986)
US Analysts' forecasts underreact to recent earnings.
Capstaff et al. (1995)
56,090 forecats of EPS for 1,315 
firms (1987-1990)
UK
Regression analysis suggests analysts’ forecast overreaction to 
EPS.
Amir and Ganzach (1998)
Monthly consensus forecasts of 
annual EPS (1976-1990)
US
Analysts' overreaction to positive forecast modifications and 
analysts' underreaction to negative forecast modifications.
De Bondt and Forbes 
(1999)
441,000 forecasts of EPS for 
1,731 firms (1986-1997)
UK Strong evidence of overreaction bias in consensus forecasts.
Easterwood and Nutt 
(1999)
10,694 consensus forecasts of 
annual EPS
US
Analysts' underreaction to negative information and analysts' 
overreaction to positive information.
Espahbodi et al. (2001)
Analysts forecasts for 350 
bankruot firms (1985-1993) and 
631 turnaround firms (1983-
1991)
US
Analysts' underreaction during four years preceding bankruptcy 
considering both cases of bankrupt and turnaround firms.
 
4.3.3. Economic-based explanation 
The systematic review also reveals some studies that justify analysts’ optimism with the 
agency conflicts faced by analysts. Table 4.7 reviews the main findings regarding the 
economic -based incentives explanation. These papers are unanimous in suggesting that 
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the agency interpretation can justify, at least partially, analysts’ optimistic forecasts and 
recommendations. There are different incentives faced by analysts that might lead to 
overoptimism. Dugar and Nathan (1995) show that investment banker analysts produce 
more optimistic forecasts than non-investment banker analysts. Hodgkinson’s (2001) 
results are in line with Dugar and Nathan (1995) since she finds that the close relation 
between firms and analysts working for broker firms provides more optimistic forecasts 
than analysts who do not have that relation. The argument used to justify this situation is 
similar to Lim (2001), who suggests that analysts’ need to improve their access to firms’ 
management to benefit from this key source of non-public company information. Michaely 
and Womack (1999) present further evidence on Dugar and Nathan’s (1995) argument of 
agency conflicts regarding broker analysts with investment banking relations. In fact, they 
find that underwriter analysts’ recommendations of IPO firms have significantly worse 
performance than non-underwriter analysts. Additionally, Hong and Kubik (2003) mention 
analysts’ career concerns as relevant to explain analysts’ optimism, since brokerage houses 
seem to reward analysts for their optimism. 
Table 4.7.: Summary of empirical evidence on analysts’ agency conflict 
Study Data
Sample 
location
Main findings regarding analysts' agency conflict
Dugar and Nathan 
(1995)
Analysts' research reports 
(1983-1988)
US
Investment banker analysts are more optimistic relative to other 
analysts, both in terms of their earnings forecasts and their 
investment recommendations.
Michaely and Womack 
(1999)
Analysts' recommendations 
of 391 IPOs (1990-1991)
US
Underwriter analysts' recommendations of IPO firms have 
significant worse performance than non-underwriter analysts.
Hodgkinson (2001)
1,096 analysts' forecasts for 
475 firms (1990-1993)
UK
Strong evidence that analysts provide optimistic forecasts for 
broker firms. Results suggest that analysts may provide optimistic 
forecasts for firms where accss to information may increase the 
superiority of their forecasts.
Hong and Kubik 
(2003)
Earnings forecasts for 
12,336 analysts (1983-
2000)
US
Analysts who are optimistic relative to the consensus are more 
likely to experience favourable job separations.
 
Although there are papers stating that cognitive biases constitute the explanation for 
analysts’ optimism, and others arguing that economic factors are behind this behaviour, 
there is no consensus regarding what constitutes the real explanation for this 
phenomenon. The lack of consensus is related to the difficulties that researchers face to 
isolate each explanation; however, Tamura (2002) presents evidence supporting the 
cognitive explanation since he advocates that analysts are affected by their personalities in 
forecasting. In fact, a relatively optimistic analyst tends to continue to be optimistic, while 
a pessimistic analyst tends to continue pessimistic. Contrary to this, Stevens and Williams 
(2004) suggest that human decision bias is unlikely to be the cause for analysts’ optimism 
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given the results of their experimental research. These contrary results indicate that 
perhaps there is no “one explanation”. Therefore, research on this issue is needed to 
understand the weight that each explanation has in the justification of analysts’ optimism. 
4.3.4. Herding behaviour 
Some of the papers reviewed present evidence of herding behaviour among security 
analysts. According to Cote and Goodstein (1999), herding behaviour implies the 
exacerbation of optimism and constrains artificially the boundaries of analysts’ earnings 
forecasts. Trueman (1994) presents a theoretical framework suggesting that, under certain 
circumstances, an analyst prefers to release a forecast that is close to prior expectations. 
Two additional papers find herding behaviour among analysts in the UK and US markets. 
Using UK data, de Bondt and Forbes (1999) show that although absolute errors increase 
with the forecast horizon, analyst disagreement remains almost unchanged. Welch (2000) 
finds that the most recent two revisions by other analysts have a positive influence on the 
next analyst revision. 
4.3.5. Analysts’ rationality 
Despite the disagreement about the reasons, it seems to be consensual that analysts are 
optimistic. According to Easterwood and Nutt’s (1999) definition of rational analyst 
behaviour, analysts’ systematic optimism is inconsistent with rationality. However, the 
systematic review finds three papers arguing that the analysts’ apparently biased behaviour 
may not imply a non-rational behaviour. In fact, Ackert and Hunter (1994) show that 
analysts’ forecasts are converging towards rational expectations from a dynamic 
perspective. Moreover, Acker and Hunter (1995) argue that some of the papers claiming 
analysts’ non-rational behaviour present methodological inadequacies, like ignoring the 
necessary orthogonality property and the use of samples with aggregation problems. More 
recently, Lim (2001) has presented an alternative explanation for analysts’ optimistic 
behaviour. He suggests that optimistic forecasts may be consistent with rationality if they 
act to decrease forecast errors. In fact, by issuing optimistic forecasts, analysts are 
improving their access to firms’ management and thus, contributing to a possible increase 
in their accuracy. 
The rationality issue has been discussed for decades. Rubinstein (2001) argues that the 
markets’ degree of rationality should be the central question to evaluate rationality in the 
accounting and finance domain. His categorizations of markets based on the degree of 
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rationality do not assume that all agents are rational. For instance, the minimum degree of 
market rationality is defined by the author allowing the possibility of agents’ non-rational 
behaviour. However, in order to ensure the minimally rational market, it is necessary that 
abnormal profit opportunities should not exist. This new insight into the discussion of 
rationality should be taken into account since apparent “irrationalities” may not imply 
irrational markets. 
4.3.6. Going-concern opinion issues 
In two studies closely related to my research topic, Taffler et al. (2004) and Kausar et al. 
(2004) find that, despite the underraction to GCM (Taffler et al., 2004 and Kausar et al., 
2004) and overreaction to GCM withdrawal (Kausar et al., 2004), their results are 
consistent with this minimally rational market. These two studies conclude that, after 
considering the arbitrage costs for small loss-making firms, the apparent magnitude of 
abnormal returns associated with a trading strategy creates an illusion of profit 
opportunity. Taffler et al. (2004) and Kausar et al. (2004) represent the starting point for 
my discussion regarding the going-concern opinion. There is no consensus on the 
informational value of going-concern opinions.46 Broadly speaking, the conflicting results 
may be due to a lack of consistency in the use of qualification announcement dates and 
windows for testing hypotheses, inability to control for concurrent information, and failure 
in distinguishing between “predictable” opinions and “surprises” (Asare, 1990). This last 
justification is consistent with the findings of Ameen et al. (1994), who find negative 
market reaction to audit qualifications only for the period before the public announcement. 
Considering that markets appear to anticipate going-concern opinions, it seems reasonable 
to examine whether this event can be predicted using publicly available information. By 
doing this, it may be possible to increase the power of the statistical tests (Asare, 1990). 
Table 4.8. reviews the main findings of papers analysing the predictability of going-concern 
opinions. The analysis of the four papers addressing this issue suggests that the going-
concern opinion can be predicted with a high level of accuracy using public information. 
Moreover, that expectation is important to explain differences in the magnitude of 
abnormal returns. Mutchler (1985) applied a discriminant analysis, using as dependent 
variables the top six ratios ranked by audit ors as useful in identifying a going-concern 
problem. Her results suggest that this information is useful to distinguish, among the firms 
with going-concern problems, those firms with GCM and those without GCM. Additionally, 
                                                 
46 Section 2.3.2. reviews this issue. 
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Loudder et al. (1992) and Jones (1996) find that the magnitude of abnormal returns is 
dependent on the expectation for an audit opinion and going-concern opinion respectively. 
In a subsequent work, Blay and Geiger (2001) find that the firm’s subsequent viability has 
implications in the abnormal returns generated. 
Table 4.8.: Summary of empirical evidence on the predictability of going-concern 
opinions 
Study Data
Sample 
location
Main findings regarding the predictability of going-
concern opinions
Mutchler (1985)
119 GCM and 119 non-GCM 
firms (1981-1982)
US
Financial ratio-based model is able to predict a going-concern 
opinion with a relatively high level of accuracy using only publicly 
available financial information.
Loudder et al. (1992)
101 firms with "subject to" 
audit opinion
US
"Unexpected" audit opinion firms are more likely to exhibit 
negative abnormal returns around the qualification disclosure date 
then the "expected" firms.
Jones (1996)
68 GCM and 86 non-GCM 
firms (1979-1988)
US
The magnitude of the abnormal returns depend on the extent to 
which the opinion type was unexpected.
Blay and Geiger 
(2001)
121 GCM firms (1990-1992) US
Abnormal returns are dependent of subsquent firm's viability. 
Abnormal returns significantly lower for the "viable" group 
compared to the subsequent bankrupt group.
 
 
This chapter reviewed the 40 papers selected in the systematic review process. The report 
of the findings is organized thematically in order to provide a comprehensive analysis of 
the phenomena. The next chapter presents the implications of the findings for further 
research as well as some reflections about the process and the methodology used. 
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CHAPTER 5 - CONCLUSION 
 
5.1. Implications for further research 
This systematic review of the literature confirms that no study to date has connected 
analyst behaviour with going-concern opinions in an attempt to clarify how analysts behave 
in this extreme case of bad news. In fact, the search strings defined to select papers within 
a restricted scope do not find any study analysing this phenomenon. Additionally, the 
review of the selected papers finds some questions about analysts’ behaviour, which 
remain unclear and represent opportunities for further research. 
Studies consistently document the fact that analysts are optimistic. However, little is known 
about their specific behaviour in extreme situations. As Schipper (1991) points out, it 
makes sense to investigate decision strategies in extreme cases, because evidence 
suggests that optimism seems to be most pronounced in forecasts preceded by share price 
declines or earnings declines. In fact, section 4.3.1. shows that analysts are particularly 
optimistic in situations of financial distress. Therefore, it is important to explore thoroughly 
how analysts deal with bad news. The study of analysts’ anticipation and response to bad 
news events can provide even clearer evidence of analysts’ optimism and their role in the 
apparent delayed impact of bad news on investors. Since the GCM is considered to be an 
extreme and unambiguous case of bad news, which has never previously been connected 
with analyst behaviour, this reason seems by itself to justify the relevance of my  research. 
However, there are more reasons justifying this connection. 
Taffler et al. (2004) and Kausar et al. (2004) find a substantial decline in the market value 
of first time going-concern firms one year before the event, attesting that a GCM audit firm 
report is perceived by the market as a clear signal of bad news. Despite the results 
showing that the market (partially but not fully) anticipates this event, analysts’ role in this 
process is unknown. Consequently, this gap generates an interesting research opportunity 
that I want to explo re. By analysing analysts’ earnings and price forecasts, 
recommendations as well as their reports, it is possible to examine whether analysts 
anticipate the forthcoming GCM, and the nature of their response to it . The alternative 
hypothesis is that analysts simply ignore this event. 
The study of analysts’ reports seems to be interesting given the evidence of informational 
value in these documents (Asquith et al., 2005). By studying analysts’ reports for the 
period around the GCM, it may be possible to clarify if analysts are able to anticipate this 
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event and the nature of their reaction. For instance, content analysis may be used in order 
to detect tone differences in analysts’ reports before and after the audit report disclosure. 
Additionally, considering the results of McNichols and O’Brien (1997), which point to 
analysts ceasing to cover firms they view unfavourably, it seems attractive to explore 
whether that situation also arises considering the GCM. This can provide further evidence 
on the anticipation/reaction discussion. Given that analysts act as sophisticated agents in 
the markets, it is reasonable to expect some active attitudes to relevant events Therefore, 
first time going-concern firms offer a clean test for studying analysts’ behaviour in extreme 
situations. 
Despite the opening question about how analysts behave in the presence of going-concern 
opinions, the results of Kausar et al. (2004) indicate the need for a deeper analysis. In fact, 
Kausar et al. (2004) find different market reactions to going-concern opinions. They find 
that the market underreacts to GCM (bad news), whilst fully anticipating GCM withdrawal 
(good news). The joint analysis of GCM (good news) and GCM withdrawals present a 
unique opportunity to investigate whether analysts exhibit asymmetric behaviour. If this 
hypothesis is correct, it can be understood as analysts potentially influencing the market 
asymmetrically. This test can provide further evidence to the results of Amir  and Ganzach 
(1998) and Easterwood and Nutt (1999), who find that analysts tend to underreact in the 
presence of bad news and overreact in the presence of good news, but only considering 
the earnings change scenario. 
The above discussion can be enhanced with the introduction of the expectations for a 
going-concern opinion. Some studies show that some techniques are useful to identify a 
firm with a potential going-concern problem (Mutchler, 1985) and the magnitude of the 
abnormal returns depends on the extent to which the opinion was expected (Loudder et 
al., 1992; Jones, 1996). Consequently, it is important to know whether analysts are using 
this publicly available in formation when they make recommendations and forecasts. If the 
magnitude of the price impact by the market depends on the predictability of the going-
concern event, it is reasonable to hypothesise that analysts behave differently conditional 
on the expected or unexpected news. 
Considering the discussion surrounding the reasons that justify analysts’ biased behaviour, 
the study of going-concern opinions might be able to clarify whether the cognitive-bias 
explanation is behind this behaviour. In fact, GCM firms represent a set of firms where the 
agency conflicts are minimized. The argument is the same used by Espahbodi et al. (2001) 
for bankrupt firms, which states that the economic benefits to analysts associated with 
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these firms are relatively small. In this particular case, analysts do not face high economic 
incentives to be particularly optimistic in this situation since these firms carry a high risk. 
Therefore, the management of these firms has a higher likelihood of being changed and 
thus, analysts’ incentives to cultivate good relations with the management are lower. The 
investor interest in analysts’ outputs, particularly from institutional investors, is also lower, 
and the potential for generating brokerage commissions is likely to be small. 
Some of the papers addressing analyst rationality state that the optimism bias may not 
imply irrationality. Despite analysts’ biased judgement, analysts may be converging 
towards rational expectations from a dynamic perspective by becoming more rational with 
the accumulation of additional relevant information (Ackert and Hunter, 1994). Therefore, 
the analysis of the magnitude of the bias can help us to understand whether analysts are 
rational from a dynamic perspective, although there is the possible rejection of the simple 
form of rational expectations hypothesis. There are some additional ingredients to this 
discussion. Espahbodi et al. (2001) find that for bankrupt firms, forecast bias declines to 
insignificant levels by the year prior to bankruptcy filing, although there is evidence of 
underreaction in the four years prior to bankruptcy. Since a considerable percentage of 
bankrupt firms has previously received a GCM, it is reasonable to consider the going-
concern firms as a cleaner case to study how analysts behave prior to the public 
announcement of the GCM. 
For all these reasons, the connection between analysts’ behaviour and going-concern 
opinions can be a contribution to both the accounting and finance literature. 
5.2. Methodology appraisal 
The systematic review of the literature revealed an important tool to avoid some 
weaknesses of the traditional literature review. In fact, the methodology defined in the 
chapter 3 is transparent and replicable to all that want to use it. This transparent process 
helped me to avoid some of my personal biases. For instance, I reviewed some non-
positivistic papers that otherwise I would certainly avoid given my strong quantitative 
background. Additionally, some papers analysed would certainly have been ignored if I had 
not searched systematically on the databases. 
However, I am convinced that this process is not free of criticism. First, one can always 
disagree with the definition of the keywords arguing that some are missing. The selection 
of keywords is crucial since all the remaining process will be sustained on the first selection 
of papers based on the search strings. In order to find a comprehensive set of keywords, 
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the involvement of the panel was essential given their knowledge in the area. Second, the 
selection of the papers based on the reading of titles and abstracts may exclude some 
papers that other researcher may include. The definition of the study’s refined scope is a 
personal choice of the researcher. Third, the classification of papers based on the quality 
appraisal is not straightforward, since different researchers may classify studies differently. 
In fact, it is not unusual that specialists attribute different classifications to academic 
studies. Finally, it can be argued that studies other than academic papers could enhance 
the quality of the review. In my systematic review, I searched for other sources of 
information, especially working papers that could be included in the review. Despite the 
effort, there are obvious limitations to the search process since it is not possible to search 
systematically for other sources of information. 
Overall, I am convinced that this dissertation benefited from the systematic review 
methodology. In fact, the level of possible criticism to a traditional literature review is much 
higher than with the systematic review methodology. The questions debated in the 
previous paragraph are related to the degree of freedom that every process has. 
5.3. Learning experience 
The systematic review of the literature revealed itself to be a continuous learning process. 
Since the beginning of the MRes course, I realized that this new approach is significantly 
different from my previous experience in my MSc in Finance that I completed a few years 
ago. The research conditions that I had during that time were incomparably inferior to 
those offered by Cranfield University at this time. My MSc dissertation in Finance was based 
only on the main references provided by my supervisor and some cross-references that I 
used. After the systematic review process, I realized that my first research experience 
would have been much better if I had had the opportunity to apply this process. 
One of the first aspects that most impressed me was the power of the databases and their 
contribution to the quality of the final work. Research institutions like Cranfield University, 
which are well equipped with learning resource centres built around technology have 
important sources of information that should not be ignored. In this context, library and 
information skills are very important to be able to take advantage of these resources. This 
new approach to information selection and research supported by electronic resources 
opened up new opportunities to conduct a rigorous and unbiased literature review. During 
this year, I learned how to work with the databases and how to manage a huge amount of 
references with the appropriate software. By doing this, besides the increase in rigour, it is 
possible to accelerate the research process. In my personal case, this is very important 
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since, as a lecturer in a Portuguese university, research will continue to be my work and 
these learning outcomes will have a positive impact on my work in the foreseeable future. 
The availability of thousands of papers is not free of risk. In fact, researchers should define 
from the very beginning the refined scope to apply the systematic search approach. There 
is the potential danger of defining too broad scope for the research study and thus working 
with an unmanageable number of studies that do not focus on the core issues of the 
research. The systematic review also opened my mind to other ways of conducting 
research. Although most of the papers in my systematic review are written from a clear 
positivistic approach, which is not unexpected given the strong positivistic approach of the 
field, this transparent process made possible the analysis of papers with a different 
approach. Otherwise, I am sure that I would have unconsciously avoided these papers 
given my strong positivistic background. The reflection about this important discussion in 
the research process allows me to conclude that papers with a different approach can 
substantially increase the value of the research with their different approach to the subject. 
Additionally, I felt that the contributions made by other people during the process were 
extremely important. In fact, the establishment of a panel at the beginning of the process 
allowed me contact with experts from the very beginning of the process. The discussion of 
my topic with researchers in the area and the contributions made by the literature 
specialists were crucial to the final output of my work. After this process, and compared 
with my first research experience, I understand the importance of the involvement of other 
people in my research. 
However, it is not possible to apply the systematic review method to other sources of 
information outside academic papers. This weakness of the process should be 
compensated for by a search for relevant sources of information like unpublished papers, 
and particularly working papers, which contain research in progress. I also realise that the 
systematic review is not by itself the solution to our problems. In fact, there is also a 
degree of subjectivity during the process, particularly during the definition of keywords and 
search strings, as well as the definition of the selection criteria. The definition of these 
issues is fundamental to the whole process, since it defines the basis for the selection of 
papers. For instance, one could argue that important keywords are missing or that the 
selection criteria are too broad or too narrow. This situation highlights the importance of 
the involvement of the panel and the idea that the systematic review eradicates researcher 
bias. However, it is unquestionable that the systematic method of conducting the review is 
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important in significantly reducing the personal bias and guaranteeing transparency of the 
process. 
5.4. Concluding remarks 
This dissertation is a literature review of the studies that can provide support for the 
connection between analyst behaviour and going-concern opinions and the basis of this 
research gap to constitute the focus of my PhD research. The next step is related to the 
extraction of the necessary data to answer the questions raised during the systematic 
review. In fact, the development of my project requires, at this stage, analyst data for all 
the US firms that received a first-time GCM. The required information includes, inter alia, 
earnings and price forecasts, earnings and actual prices, analysts’ recommendations and 
brokerage house reports. 
The systematic review of the literature used in this dissertation represents an alternative 
method to avoid the weaknesses of the traditional “narrative” review. After finishing this 
process, I am convinced that this method of conducting a review gave additional value to 
my findings and conclusions. I finish my work with a quotation that I found particularly 
important during this process: 
 
“There is no such thing as the perfect review.” 
Hart (1998) 
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Appendices 
Appendix 1: Summary of selected papers 
 
Data Sample location Empirical / Non-empirical 
EPS forecasts for 178 firms 
(1976-1986) 
US Empirical 
Study’s motivation: Investigate whether security analysts underreact or overreact to prior earnings 
information. 
S
tu
d
y 
1
: 
 A
ba
rb
an
el
l a
nd
 B
er
na
rd
 (
19
92
) 
Findings:  
Ø Analysts’ forecasts are extreme; 
Ø Analysts’ forecasts underreact to recent earnings; 
Ø Results do not support the overreaction phenomenon since analysts’ forecasts were most in 
error in situations where they were optimistic despite poor recent earnings performance; 
Ø Security analysts’ behaviour is at best only a partial explanation for stock price underreaction. 
Data Sample location Empirical / Non-empirical 
1,716 estimates (1st quarter of 1986) and 2,145 
estimates of EPS (4th quarter of 1988) 
US Empirical 
Study’s motivation: Examine the effect of new information on analysts’ forecast revisions and evaluate 
whether these revised forecasts converge to rational expectations forecasts. 
S
tu
d
y 
2
: 
 A
ck
er
t a
nd
 H
un
te
r 
(1
99
4)
 
Findings:  
Ø Rejection of the simple form of the rational expectations hypothesis; 
Ø Analysts’ earnings forecasts conform to a dynamic form of rationality; 
Ø Results are consistent with the presence of herding behaviour among security analysts.  
Data Sample location Empirical / Non-empirical 
3,640 earnings estimates for 220 firms 
(1984-1990) 
US Empirical 
Study’s motivation: Analyse the rationality of analysts’ earnings forecasts by conducting generalized 
orthogonality tests that evaluate forecasts rationality in the sense of reflecting publicly available information. 
S
tu
d
y 
3
: 
Ac
ke
rt
 a
nd
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un
te
r 
(1
99
5)
 
Findings:  
Ø Results reject analyst forecast rationality, but not without exception; 
Ø Analysts’ rational hypothesis is sensitive to the analysts’ forecasts chosen, time period and 
observation interval. 
Data Sample location Empirical / Non-empirical 
51 first-time qualified opinions 
(1975-1988) 
US Empirical 
Study’s motivation: Evaluate whether audit qualifications for small firms have informational value to 
investors.  
S
tu
d
y 
4
: 
A
m
ee
n 
et
 a
l. 
(1
99
4)
 
Findings:  
Ø Market reacts negatively before the first observable public announcement. 
Ø No significant negative response is associated with the announcement of the qualification. The 
reaction is mitigated by previous market reaction in response to the expectation; 
Ø The market reacts to the circumstances underlying the qualification prior to the initial release of 
the report. 
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Data Sample location Empirical / Non-empirical 
Monthly consensus forecasts of annual EPS 
(1976-1990) 
US Empirical 
Study’s motivation: Analyse hypotheses derived from behavioural decision theory regarding conditions that 
lead to overreaction and conditions that lead to underreaction in analysts’ earnings forecasts.  
S
tu
d
y 
5
: 
Am
ir 
an
d 
G
an
za
ch
 (
19
98
) 
 
Findings:  
Ø Definition of a model where three heuristics jointly influence earnings forecasts: leniency, 
representativeness and anchoring and adjustments; 
Ø Results suggest a tendency towards overreaction in forecast changes and underreaction in 
forecast revisions; 
Ø Results show that there is overreaction to positive forecast modifications and underreaction to 
negative forecast modifications; 
Ø Results suggest the longer the prediction horizon, the larger the prediction bias. 
Data Sample location Empirical / Non-empirical 
- - Non-empirical 
Study’s motivation: Review the evolution of the going-concern report and the empirical research.  
S
tu
d
y 
6
: 
As
ar
e 
(1
99
0)
 
 Findings:  
Ø Studies addressing the informational value of going-concern reports are not always consistent; 
Ø The conflicting results may be due to a lack of consistency in the use of qualification 
announcement dates and windows for testing hypotheses, inability to control for concurrent 
information, and failure in distinguishing between “predictable” opinions and “surprises”; 
Ø Research results can be enhanced by using statistical tests of stock price effects that distinguish 
between “predictable” opinions and “surprises”. 
Data Sample location Empirical / Non-empirical 
1,126 analyst reports (1997-1999) US Empirical 
Study’s motivation: Investigate the association between market returns and the content of security analyst 
reports.  
S
tu
d
y 
7
: 
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qu
ith
 e
t 
al
. (
20
05
) 
 Findings:  
Ø Changes in summary earnings forecasts, stock recommendations, and price targets provide 
independent information to the capital markets; 
Ø Analyst reports have a role in interpreting information from other sources; 
Ø The strength of the written arguments made to support an analysts’ opinion is important to 
justify market reaction. The stronger the justification provided in the report, the stronger the 
market’s reaction to the report; 
Ø The market treats an analyst report differently according to whether it is an old 
recommendation, an upgrade or a downgrade. 
Data Sample location Empirical / Non-empirical 
Earnings forecasts for selected companies 
(1993-2002) 
Europe Empirical 
Study’s motivation: Study whether fundamental company characteristics, sector and country affect analysts’ 
forecast errors.  
S
tu
d
y 
8
: 
Be
ck
er
s 
et
 a
l. 
(2
00
4)
 
 
Findings:  
Ø Forecast error and forecast optimism increase with dispersion in analyst forecasts and with 
stock return volatility; 
Ø Geographical differences do not explain earnings forecast errors; 
Ø Earnings forecast accuracy exhibits significant sector effects; 
Ø One month before the earnings announcement date, only analyst dispersion and stock price 
volatility remained significantly positively related to forecast bias.  
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Data Sample location Empirical / Non-empirical 
121 GCM firms 
(1990-1992) 
US Empirical 
Study’s motivation: Assess market reaction to going-concern report recipients by using previously proposed 
measures of market expectations and a naïve model based on actual subsequent viability status.  
S
tu
d
y 
9
: 
Bl
ay
 a
nd
 G
ei
ge
r 
(1
99
5)
 
 
Findings:  
Ø Abnormal returns surrounding the announcement of a going-concern audit report are not 
significantly different from zero for the entire group of 121 firms; 
Ø When partitioned based on subsequent viability status, abnormal returns were significantly 
lower for the viable group compared to the subsequent bankrupt group; 
Ø Results indicate that actual subsequent bankruptcy or viability acts as a proxy for market 
expectations of a firm performance. 
Data Sample location Empirical / Non-empirical 
Analysts’ quarterly earnings forecasts 
(1983-1996) 
US Empirical 
Study’s motivation: Analyse whether analyst forecasting errors are related to firms’ characteristics. 
S
tu
d
y 
10
: 
Br
ow
n 
(1
99
7)
 
 
Findings:  
Ø Analyst forecasting errors and bias have decreased over time; 
Ø Analyst forecasting errors are smaller for S&P 500 firms than for other firms; 
Ø Analyst forecasting errors are smaller for firms with comparatively large amounts of market 
capitalization, absolute value of earnings forecast, and analyst following; 
Ø Analyst forecasting errors are smaller for firms in certain industries. 
Data Sample location Empirical / Non-empirical 
56,090 forecasts of EPS for 1,315 firms 
(1987-1990) 
UK Empirical 
Study’s motivation: Provide a comprehensive analysis of the accuracy and rationality of UK analysts’ 
forecasts earnings.  
S
tu
d
y 
1
1:
 
Ca
ps
ta
ff
 e
t a
l. 
(1
99
5)
 
 
Findings:  
Ø Results cast considerable doubt on the rationality of earnings forecasts; 
Ø Analysts’ earnings forecasts superiority diminishes over longer horizons; 
Ø Analysts do not take account of all available information when producing their forecasts; 
Ø Analysts’ forecast revisions are in part predictable given their relation to prior forecast changes 
in earnings. 
Data Sample location Empirical / Non-empirical 
- - Non-empirical 
Study’s motivation: Create an awareness of the ethical dimension of the herding behaviour phenomenon. 
S
tu
d
y 
1
2:
 
Co
te
 a
nd
 G
oo
st
ei
n 
(1
99
9)
 
 
Findings:  
Ø Motivations and implications of herding behaviour among security analysts are discussed; 
Ø The authors question the ethics of herding behaviour when the motive to protect reputation 
takes precedence over the forecast accuracy motive; 
Ø They claim for the need to cultivate a climate of personal and public integrity. 
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Data Sample location Empirical / Non-empirical 
Mean monthly analysts’ forecasts 
(1985-1993) 
US Empirical 
Study’s motivation: Explore whether there are systematic differences in the commonly used metrics of 
analyst performance between a losing and a profitable firm.  
S
tu
d
y 
1
3:
 
D
as
 (
19
98
) 
 
Findings:  
Ø Results suggest that analysts are in general more optimistically biased for loss firms than they 
are for non-loss making firms; 
Ø Analysts are less accurate in their earnings forecasts for loss firms relative to non-loss firms; 
Ø The magnitude of bias for loss and non-loss firms decline and the accuracy improves as the 
forecast horizon gets closer to the earnings announcement. 
Data Sample location Empirical / Non-empirical 
441,000 forecasts of EPS for 1,731 firms 
(1986-1977) 
UK Empirical 
Study’s motivation: Analyse the accuracy and dispersion of financial analyst earnings forecasts in the UK. 
S
tu
d
y 
1
4:
 
D
e 
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nd
t a
nd
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be
s 
(1
99
9)
 
 
Findings:  
Ø Results point to excessive optimism and overreaction bias in consensus forecasts; 
Ø Results suggest herding behaviour among financial analysts; 
Ø As the forecast horizon lengthens, the accuracy of the EPS forecasts deteriorates sharply but 
analyst consensus is unaffected and remains strong; 
Ø As more analysts produce forecasts, disagreement rises until 8 predictions. Additional forecasts 
do not add to the forecast dispersion.  
Data Sample location Empirical / Non-empirical 
Forecast changes in EPS for one and two-year time 
horizon (1976-1984) 
US Empirical 
Study’s motivation: Study whether security analysts overreact in their forecasts.  
S
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d
y 
1
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D
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 T
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r 
(1
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Findings:  
Ø Forecast changes are simply to extreme to be considered rational; 
Ø Results suggest unrealistic optimism among security analysts; 
Ø Results are consistent with generalized overreaction. 
Data Sample location Empirical / No n-empirical 
Quarterly EPS forecasts for 2,084 firms 
(1987-2000) 
US Empirical 
Study’s motivation: Examine how prospect theory can be used to explain stock returns and analysts’ 
forecast behaviour.  
S
tu
d
y 
1
6:
 
D
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g 
et
 a
l. 
(2
00
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Findings:  
Ø Stock returns react strongly to positive earnings surprise, but negative earnings surprise has no 
significant impact on returns; 
Ø Despite analysts’ accuracy during positive earnings growth, their forecasts are highly optimistic 
during negative earnings growth; 
Ø Overly optimistic forecast errors during periods of negative earnings growth are associated with 
the presence of positive investor sentiment. 
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Data Sample location Empirical / Non-empirical 
Analysts’ research reports (1983-1988) US Empirical 
Study’s motivation: Analyse the incentives that analysts face when the brokerage firm employing them also 
provides investment banking services to the (client) company about which the analyst issues research reports.  
S
tu
d
y 
1
7:
 
D
ug
ar
 a
nd
 S
iv
a 
(1
99
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 Findings:  
Ø Financial analysts of brokerage firms that provide investment banking services to a company 
(investment banker analysts) are optimistic, relative to other (non-investment banker) analysts; 
Ø Capital market participants appear to be aware of the conflict of interest problems of the 
investment banker analyst. There is a significant market reaction around the non-investment 
banker analyst’s research report date, but not around the investment banker analyst’s research 
report date; 
Ø Earnings forecasts of investment banker analysts are, on average, as accurate as those of non-
investment banker analysts.  
Data Sample location Empirical / Non-empirical 
10,694 consensus forecasts of annual EPS US Empirical 
Study’s motivation: Investigate the apparent tendency of analysts to misinterpret earnings information. 
S
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1
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) 
 Findings:  
Ø Analysts underreact to negative information, but overreact to positive information; 
Ø Analysts underreact to the negative implications of weak prior-earnings performance, and 
overreact to the positive implications of strong prior-earnings performance; 
Ø Analysts’ revision of forecasts in response to the prior year’s forecast error suggest that analysts 
underreact to abnormally negative forecast errors and overreact to abnormally positive forecast 
errors; 
Ø Results are consistent with systematic optimism in reponse to earnings information. 
Data Sample location Empirical / Non-empirical 
Analysts forecasts for 350 bankrupt firms (1985-
1993) and 631 turnaround firms (1983-1991) 
US Empirical 
Study’s motivation: Evaluate whether observed optimism in analysts’ forecasts of earnings is related to the 
cost and benefits to analysts of issuing optimistic forecasts. 
S
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d
y 
1
9:
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l. 
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 Findings:  
Ø Results show that some of the properties of analysts’ earnings forecasts for financially 
distressed firms are different from non-distressed firms; 
Ø Considering a sample of bankrupt firms, analysts’ forecasts bias declines to insignificant levels 
by the year prior to bankruptcy filing; 
Ø Forecast bias for the turnaround firms disappears in the year of recovery and remains absent 
during the first half of the following year; 
Ø Results support the idea that analysts’ optimism will be less apparent or absent when the cost 
of issuing optimistic forecast is high relative to the benefits of doing so.  
Data Sample location Empirical / Non-empirical 
4,002 analyst recommendation changes  
(1989-1992) 
US Empirical 
Study’s motivation: Explore the rationales provided when sell-side analysts change investment 
recommendations. 
S
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d
y 
2
0:
 
H
o 
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d 
H
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 (
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00
) 
Findings:  
Ø Statements accompanying most analyst recommendations provide fundamental information 
about companies to markets; 
Ø Market participants apparently pay attention to the words behind analysts’ investment advice; 
Ø Analysts seem to be more careful when issuing downgrades. They only do that when they are 
sufficiently confident to support the change with a quantitative analysis, namely an earnings 
forecast revision; 
Ø Price reactions are not confined to the two-day period around the release of the 
recommendation. 
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Data Sample location Empirical / Non-empirical 
1,096 analysts’ forecasts for 475 firms 
(1990-1993) 
UK Empirical 
Study’s motivation: Extend previous research by examining the impact of the relationship between brokers 
and firms. 
S
tu
d
y 
2
1:
 
H
od
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n 
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00
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Findings:  
Ø Analysts’ forecasts are not more accurate for brokerage firms; 
Ø Results show strong evidence that analysts provide optimistic forecasts for brokerage firms; 
Ø Analysts may provide optimistic forecasts for firms where access to information may increase 
the superiority of their forecasts over time-series forecasts.  
Data Sample location Empirical / Non-empirical 
Earnings forecasts for 12,336 analysts 
(1983-2000) 
US Empirical 
Study’s motivation: Analyse security analysts’ career concerns by relating their earnings forecasts to job 
separations.  
S
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d
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2
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d 
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k 
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Findings:  
Ø Analysts who are more accurate are more likely to experience a move up the hierarchy; 
Ø Analysts who issue relatively optimistic forecasts are more likely to experience favourable job 
separations; 
Ø For analysts who cover stocks underwritten by their houses, job separation depend less on 
accuracy and more on optimism.  
Data Sample location Empirical / Non-empirical 
Mean estimates of analysts’ EPS for all the largest 
1,500 firms (1977-1990) 
US Empirical 
Study’s motivation: Evaluate the persistence and magnitude of “predictability bias” in the US market. 
S
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Findings:  
Ø Analysts’ estimates of earnings were excessively optimistic for companies whose earnings have 
been hard to predict in the past; 
Ø Stocks of firms whose earnings have been previously hard to predict underperform the stocks of 
firms whose earnings have been relatively easy to predict; 
Ø Analysts are not learning from past mistakes, since EPS forecasts appear to be biased in a 
consistently positive manner. 
Data Sample location Empirical / Non-empirical 
68 GCM and 86 non-GCM firms 
(1979-1988) 
US Empirical 
Study’s motivation: Analyse the informational content of the independent auditor’s going concern disclosure 
by examining the stock returns surrounding the release of the independent auditor’s opinion. 
S
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d
y 
2
4:
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s 
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Findings:  
Ø Mean abnormal returns surrounding the release of the auditor’s report was negative for firms 
which received going concern opinions and positive for distressed firms which received clean 
opinions; 
Ø Mean abnormal returns surrounding the release of the auditor’s report were lower for going 
concern opinions than for clean opinions; 
Ø The magnitude of the abnormal returns depends on the extent to which the opinion type was 
unexpected. 
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Data Sample location Empirical / Non-empirical 
845 non-finance firms with first-time GCM 
(1994-2002) 
US Empirical 
Study’s motivation: Study  the medium-term stock price behaviour of firms with first-time GCM audit opinions 
and examine differential market responses to the GCM event and cases where the GCM is withdrawn. 
S
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d
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2
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Findings:  
Ø Market fully anticipates good news while underreact to bad news; 
Ø Adjusting for transaction costs, the opportunity to earn profits by trading on this anomaly is 
highly risky; 
Ø Results consistent with the minimally rational paradigm of Rubinstein (2001).  
Data Sample location Empirical / Non-empirical 
Analysts’ quarterly earnings forecasts for 300 
brokerage firms (1984-1996) 
US Empirical 
Study’s motivation: Test a set of predicted cross-sectional relationships between forecast bias and company 
and analysts characteristics.  
S
tu
d
y 
2
6:
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m
 (
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Findings:  
Ø Forecast bias varies predictably across firms and analysts consistently with the idea that trading 
off bias to improve management access and forecast precision may minimize the expected 
squared error of analysts’ forecasts.  
Ø Results suggest that positive and predictable bias may be a rational property of optimal 
earnings forecasts; 
Ø Analysts’ forecasts are more optimistic for smaller companies, and those that have a smaller 
analyst following, higher volatility, and past poor performances.  
Data Sample location Empirical / Non-empirical 
Between 2,857 and 4,670 earnings forecasts 
(1988-1993) 
Germany Empirical 
Study’s motivation: Test the rationality of earnings forecasts and discriminating among several competing 
explanations for biases.  
S
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d
y 
2
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) 
Findings:  
Ø Results suggest that biases can be useful for communicating information about forecast 
precision; 
Ø When analysts believe their clients misconceive the true precision of the forecast, they distort 
their estimates in a way which gives them a more appropriate weight in the clients’ decision 
process; 
Ø Results seem to support the psychological literature and seem to be only of limited economic 
importance. 
Data Sample location Empirical / Non-empirical 
101 firms with “subject to” audit opinion US Empirical 
Study’s motivation: Analyse the information content of a “subject to” opinion by distinguish between the 
expected opinions and unexpected opinions. 
S
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d
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2
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Findings:  
Ø The disclosure of an unexpected opinion and the non-disclosure of an expected opinion have 
market impact; 
Ø Results show that “unexpected” audit opinion firms are more likely to exhibit negative abnormal 
returns around the qualification disclosure date than the “expected” firms. 
 
 
 
 
CRANFIELD SCHOOL OF MANAGEMENT  97 
 
Data Sample location Empirical / Non-empirical 
13,258 analysts’ recommendations and earnings 
forecasts (1990-1994) 
US Empirical 
Study’s motivation: Investigate the relation between analysts’ information about a stock’s future prospects 
and their decision to issue investment recommendations.  
S
tu
d
y 
2
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Findings:  
Ø Results document the influence of self-selection on the distribution of analysts’ forecasts and 
recommendations. Analysts tend to start covering firms they view favourably and stop covering 
firms they view unfavourably; 
Ø Evidence suggests that analysts infrequently issue sell recommendations; 
Ø Results should be interpreted as partial explanation for analysts’ optimism by refusing the idea 
that analysts introduce less forecast bias near the end of coverage. 
Data Sample location Empirical / Non-empirical 
Analysts’ recommendations of 391 IPOs 
(1990-1991) 
US Empirical 
Study’s motivation: Investigate the conflict of interest and the credibility of underwriter analyst 
recommendations. 
S
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Findings:  
Ø Recommendations by underwriter analysts show significant evidence of bias; 
Ø Recommendations by underwriters are significantly worse then the performance of firms 
recommended by other brokerage houses; 
Ø Results suggest a potential conflict of interest inherent in the different functions that investment 
bankers perform.  
Data Sample location Empirical / Non-empirical 
Annual EPS forecasts for 136 firms declaring 
bankruptcy  
US Empirical 
Study’s motivation: Study differences in analysts’ earnings forecasts between failing and healthy firms. 
S
tu
d
y 
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) 
Findings:  
Ø Results suggest that the properties of forecasts may be a function of information disclosure 
practices of firms; 
Ø Forecast errors are larger and increase for failing firms as bankruptcy approaches; 
Ø Forecasts are overoptimistic and bias increases for failing firms as bankruptcy approaches; 
Ø Measures developed from analysts’ forecasts have information content for predicting 
bankruptcy. 
Data Sample location Empirical / Non-empirical 
119 GCM and 119 non-GCM firms 
(1981-1982) 
US Empirical 
Study’s motivation: Evaluate the relation between the going-concern opinion and publicly available 
information. 
S
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d
y 
3
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M
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Findings:  
Ø Results suggest that financial ratio-based model is able to predict a going-concern opinion with 
a relatively high level of accuracy using only publicly available financial information; 
Ø While going-concern opinion does not appear to have additional information content for the 
majority of companies, there are specific cases in which the qualification has marginal 
information content. 
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Data Sample location Empirical / Non-empirical 
Revisions of the consensus EPS forecasts 
(1987-1990) 
UK Empirical 
Study’s motivation: Observe the relationship between the magnitude of earnings changes and the 
magnitude of the forecast earnings changes.  
S
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d
y 
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3:
 
O
’H
an
lo
n 
an
d 
W
hi
dd
et
t (
19
91
) 
Findings:  
Ø Consensus EPS forecasts have been subjected to underreaction; 
Ø Results are in conflict with those of various US studies; 
Ø Analyst remuneration system and possible international differences in investment regulation are 
presented as possible explanations for the conflicting results.  
Data Sample location Empirical / Non-empirical 
- - Non-empirical 
Study’s motivation: Analyse the hypothesis of rational markets. 
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d
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n 
(2
00
1)
 
Findings:  
Ø The author proposes three market categorizations based on the degree of rationality: Maximally 
rational markets, rational markets and minimally rational markets; 
Ø The paper discusses behavioural arguments justifying human beings irrationality; 
Ø The paper discusses some of the most serious historical evidence against market rationality. 
Data Sample location Empirical / Non-empirical 
Analysis of case material by 86 sell-side analysts US Empirical 
Study’s motivation: Evaluate whether analysts’ cognitive reactions to the structure of information about 
manager’s future plans cause patterns of unintentional optimism in earnings forecasts. 
S
tu
d
y 
3
5:
 
Se
do
r 
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Findings:  
Ø The use of scenarios to provide analysts with information about a manager’s plans to increase 
future earnings causes optimism in analysts’ forecasts for two years ahead; 
Ø Scenario-induced optimism is greater for a firm that reports prior losses than a firm that reports 
prior profits; 
Ø Results show that the form in which managers communicate information can lead analysts to 
issue unintentionally optimistic forecasts, particularly for loss firms. 
Data Sample location Empirical / Non-empirical 
Forecasts elicited from 101 undergraduate students 
in accounting and economics 
US Empirical 
Study’s motivation: Examine inefficiency in analysts’ earnings forecasts using experimental research. 
S
tu
d
y 
3
6:
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W
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ia
m
s 
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Findings:  
Ø Results reveal systematic underreaction to both positive and negative information; 
Ø Underreaction is generally greater for positive information than negative information; 
Ø Results suggest that the optimism bias found in archival studies is not attributable to general 
human decision-making bias. 
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Data Sample location Empirical / Non-empirical 
108 non-finance firms with first-time GCM 
(1995-2000) 
UK Empirical 
Study’s motivation: Investigate the stock price reaction to UK going-concern audit report disclosures in the 
calendar year subsequent to publication.  
S
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d
y 
3
7:
 
Ta
ff
le
r e
t a
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00
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Findings:  
Ø Evidence that market takes time to assimilate bad news; 
Ø Results suggest that market underreacts to going-concern modifications after the release of 
those reports; 
Ø Results show that the market underreaction is not a post-earnings announcement drift 
phenomenon; 
Ø Costly arbitrage prevents rational investors forcing prices back into line with fundamental value. 
Data Sample location Empirical / Non-empirical 
Individual-analyst historical earnings estimates 
(1986-1998) 
US Empirical 
Study’s motivation: Examine how characteristics of analysts affect their forecast errors. 
S
tu
d
y 
3
8:
 
 T
am
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a 
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00
2)
 
Findings:  
Ø Results suggest that analysts dealing with bad news and analysts who herd to consensus 
forecasts tend to underreact in the presence of new information compared with other analysts; 
Ø Analysts are affected by their personalities in forecasting, particularly when they are dealing 
with bad news. 
Data Sample location Empirical / Non-empirical 
- - Non-empirical 
Study’s motivation: Develop a theoretical explanation for herding behaviour among analysts. 
S
tu
d
y 
3
9:
 
Tr
ue
m
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 (
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Findings:  
Ø Under certain circumstances an analyst prefers to release a forecast that is close related to prior 
earnings expectations, even if issuing a more extreme forecast is justified by his private 
information; 
Ø The likelihood that the analyst releases a forecast similar to those previously announced by 
other analysts is greater than could be justified by his own information.  
Data Sample location Empirical / Non-empirical 
50,000 analysts’ recommendations (1989-1994) US Empirical 
Study’s motivation: Test empirically for the presence of herding behaviour among security analysts.  
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Findings:  
Ø Evidence of a positive influence of the most recent two revisions on the next analyst’s revision; 
Ø The influence of the prevailing consensus is not stronger if the consensus accurately forecasts 
subsequent stock price movements; 
Ø Herding towards the consensus is significantly stronger when market conditions are favourable. 
 
 
 
 
 
